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COUNTING THE CASH: DISCLOSURE AND
CASH BALANCE PLANS
DANA M. MUIR*
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Over the past few years, numerous employers have converted
their traditional pension
plans into a new type of plan known as a
"cash balance plan." 2 While that may sound like an esoteric
change unlikely to receive much attention from anyone outside the
small community of pension actuaries and ERISA lawyers, actual
experience indicates otherwise. For example, when the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) held hearings on the regulation of cash
balance plans in April 2003, the hearings drew television networks
and congressional representatives.3 Many people and groups
wanted to speak so the hearings had to be scheduled in an
auditorium over a two-day period, which is hardly the norm for
IRS consideration of pension regulation. 4 Further, when IBM
announced the conversion of its pension plan in May 1999,5
* Louis and Myrtle Moskowitz Research Professor of Business and Law &
Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Michigan Business School.
I would like to thank R. Joshua Ruland and Kristopher Korvun for research
assistance. This work would not have been possible without the research
support of the University of Michigan Business School.
1. Scott Adams, Dilbert, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 23, 2000, at Comics [DILBERT
reprinted by permission of United Feature Syndicate, Inc.].
2. See infra Part I for a general discussion of conversions. The first cash
balance plan conversion occurred in 1985. Eaton v. Onan Corp., 117 F. Supp.
2d 812, 816 (D. Ind. 2000).
3. The Cash Balance Plan Hearings:A Recap, 3 EMPLOYEE PLANS NEWS
(Internal
Revenue
Service),
Summer
2003,
9
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/sum03.pdf (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
4. Id.
5. INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINES CORPORATION PROXY STATEMENT
FOR THE ANNUAL MEETING OF SHAREHOLDERS 22-23 (Mar. 13, 2000)
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affected employees united,6 sought relief in Congress 7 and brought
a shareholder resolution against implementation of the cash
balance plan.8
Congress has held hearings on the general issue of plan
conversions. 9 In 1999, the ERISA Advisory Council studied
conversions as one of its major projects.' 0 "At least [twenty]
percent of the Fortune 1000 companies... have converted... to a
cash balance plan."'1 Now, the major challenges employees face in
the workplace, besides small cubicles, incompetent managers and
backstabbing fellow employees, include pension plan conversions,
as lampooned in the Dilbert comic strip. 12
The underlying source of this controversy is that many of the
plan conversions have dilatory effects on some older, long-term
employees.1 3 Under the original plans, these employees would
have seen their pension benefits increase dramatically during

[hereinafter 2000 IBM PROXY STATEMENT].
6. Hybrid Pension Plans: Hearings Before the Full Senate Comm. on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, 106th Cong. 40 (2000) [hereinafter
Hybrid Pension Plans] (statement of Janet Krueger, spokesperson for IBM
Employee Benefits Action Coalition) (representing group of IBM employees

formed in July 1999 to convince IBM to restore pension benefits for 100% of
vested employees); 2000 IBM PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 22-23.
7. Hybrid Pension Plans,supra note 6, at 40 (statement of Janet Krueger).
8. 2000 IBM PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 22-23.
9. The Cash Balance Conundrum: How to Promote Pensions Without
Harming Participants:Hearing Before the Senate Special Comm. on Aging,
106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter The Cash Balance Conundrum]; Hybrid
Pension Plans, supra note 6; Hearing on Pension Issues Before the Senate
Comm. on Finance, 106th Cong. (1999).
10. Secretary's Advisory Committee on Employee Welfare and Pension
Plans, Report/Recommendations of the Working Group Studying the Trend in
the Defined Benefit Market to Hybrid Plans (1999) [hereinafter Advisory
Council Report]. The Advisory Council is established to give advice to the
Secretary of Labor on pension and welfare benefit plan issues. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1142(b) (2000).
11. Colleen T. Congel & Elizabeth A. White, Prospects for Pension
Initiatives Unclear, Movement on Social Security Unlikely, 27 PENS. & BEN.
REP. (BNA) 141 (Jan. 18, 2000). See Michael E. Lichman & Herbert B. Smith,
Implementation, Communications Strategies Essential for Cash Balance Plan
Success, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT PLAN REVIEW, Jan. 2000, at 38 (noting that over
20% of Fortune 500 companies have converted to a CB plan); Daniel
Eisenberg, The Big Pension Swap, TIME, Apr. 19, 1999, at 36 (stating "[slome
20% of FORTUNE 500 companies, including AT&T and Xerox, now offer [CB]
plans"); Bernard Sanders, IBM Workers Fight Back, THE NATION, Jan. 24,
2000, at 7 (stating "[twenty] percent of Fortune 500 companies and more than
300 companies in all have slashed the retirement benefits that they promised
their employees" by converting to a CB plan).
12. Adams, supra note 1, at Comics.
13. See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text (discussing the concept of
"wearaway," and how older employees are disadvantaged by switching to CB
plans).
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their last few years of employment. 14 Instead, the new plans often
have the effect of either temporarily freezing the benefits of the
older employees, or at the very least, causing them to be worse off
at retirement than they would have been under the original plan. 15
In contrast, younger workers see their benefits increase more
rapidly under the new plans than they would have under the
original plans. 16 As a result, some detractors allege that the
conversions violate the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1974 (ADEA). 17
Others argue that the conversions violate
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code (IRC),18 or the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). 19 Beyond the
legal arguments, opponents attack conversions as unfairly
repudiating the implicit compensation contract between employers
20
and employees.
From the perspective of employers, the new plans help them
recruit and retain employees in the tight labor market that existed
when the trend to cash balance plans began. 2' The plans probably
decreased employers' benefit costs during the recent economic
decline. 22
Some employers believe that employees better
understand the new plans and place a higher value on them than
on equally costly old-style plans. 23 This is in part because of
regulation on how employers could fund the old-style plans;
employers with aging workforces now are facing dramatically
increasing plan costs. 24 By making the change to cash balance

14. See infra note 63 and accompanying text (concluding that demographic
changes may have led to increased conversion to CB plans).
15. See infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (explaining why the plan
conversions have this effect).
16. See infra notes 61-63 and accompanying text (discussing the effect of
demographic changes on pension plan conversions).
17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000).
For a brief discussion of the age
discrimination issues, see infra Part II.A.1..
18. For a discussion of the IRC issues, see infra notes 198-201 and
accompanying text.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461. For a discussion of the ERISA issues, see infra
Part II.A.2.
20. See infra Part II.B (discussing ethical challenges to CB plan
conversions).
21. See infra Part I.B.1 (discussing practical motivations for CB plan
conversions).
22. PATRICK J. PURCELL, PENSION ISSUES: CASH BALANCE PLANS 5 (CRS

Report
for
Congress
2003),
available
at
http://www.pensionrights.org/docs/RL30196.pdf (last visited Mar. 29, 2004).
23. See infra note 56 and accompanying text (discussing factors employers
reported for plan conversions).
24. Pensions

in

Crisis, WATSON

WYATT

INSIDER,

Sept.

2003,

at

http:/www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/showarticle.asp?ArticleID=l1813
&Component=The+Insider (last visited Mar. 23, 2004). See infra notes 81-85
and accompanying text (discussing impact of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act on pension plans).
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plans, those employers may be able to decrease their current
funding obligations, thereby avoiding a drag on corporate
performance .25
Opponents of cash balance plans are likely to continue their
fight for substantive regulation to limit the effect of plan
conversions. 26 In contrast, many legislative proposals intended to
address the perceived problems of cash balance plans,2 7 including
the only enacted legislation on point,28 have focused primarily on
increasing the disclosure requirements associated with plan
conversions. After its in-depth study, the ERISA Advisory Council
increased disclosure rather than substantive
advocated
29
regulation.
The existing literature on conversions to cash balance plans
focuses on their legality,3 0 and as a result fails to address the

25. Vineeta Anand, Full Disclosure; Lawmakers Ask: Where's Income?,
PENSIONS & INV., July 24, 2000, at 1 [hereinafter Anand, Full Disclosure]
(stating "IBM... reported $638 million in pension income at the end of 1999,
or 5.3% of its operating income"). See also Vineeta Anand, Bottom Line:
Pension Funds Become Profit Center, PENSIONS & INv., July 26, 2000, at 1
(discussing studies indicating that "pension funds might have morphed into
profit centers from cost centers at many of the nation's largest companies").
26. See The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 30-50 (statement of
Karen Ferguson, Director of The Pension Rights Center) (arguing substantive
regulation on cash balance conversions should include three components: (1)
employee option to be grand fathered in original plan, (2) protection of
employees' reasonable expectations, and (3) taxation of conversions that fail to
comply with item (1) or (2)); id. at 8-29 (statement of Joseph Perkins, former
president America Association of Retired Persons) (proposing that (1)
employees have choice of plans or be grand fathered in original plan, and (2)
plans be prohibited from 'freezing' benefit accruals for older employees);
Statement by AARP Directorof FederalAffairs David Certnerin Support of the
Sanders-Miller Cash Balance Pension Legislation, Apr. 8, 2003, at
http://www.aarp.org/research/press/presscurrent
news/cn-2003/Articles/a2003-08-18-pensionlegislation.html (last visited Mar.
26, 2004).
27. Pension Right to Know Act, H.R. 1176/S. 659, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999);
The Comprehensive Retirement Security and Pension Reform Act of 1999,
H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 407 (1999); Pension Reduction Disclosure Act, H.R.
3047/S. 1708, 106th Cong. §§ 2-4 (1999). But see Older Workers Pension
Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 2759/S. 1600, 106th Cong. (1999) (imposing
substantive requirements as well as increased disclosure); Pension Benefits
Protection and Preservation Act of 1999, H.R. 2902/S. 1640, 106th Cong.
(1999) (imposing substantive requirements as well as increased disclosure).
28. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA),
Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 659, 115 Stat. 70 (2001).
29. Advisory Council Report, supra note 10.
30. See, e.g., The Future'of Private Pensions: Proceedings of the 2001
Annual Meeting of the Association of American Law Schools, Section on
Employee Benefits, 5 EMPL. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 351, 355 (2001) [hereinafter
The Future of Private Pensions] (presentation by Jonathan B. Forman) (noting
that routine CB conversions generally do not violate pension or age
discrimination laws); id. at 366 (presentation by Norman P. Stein) (discussing
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policy and legislative interest in enhancing the disclosure
requirements imposed on employers who implement plan
conversions. This article develops a theoretical voting model to
assess the expected effect that increased information would have
on the rate and terms of plan conversions. For those who are
unfamiliar with the phenomena Part I will provide background on
the conversions of defined benefit plans to cash balance plans.
Part II will examine the legal and ethical issues raised by plan
conversions. Part III will evaluate the rationales for requiring
increased disclosure.
If the goal of providing increased
information is to effect change, that change could occur on a group
level, an individual level, or a relational level. However, only a
group level effect would have an impact on the rate and terms of
cash balance plan conversions. In Part IV, a voting model is
developed to analyze the expected effect of additional disclosure
requirements. The modeling predicts that increased disclosure is
unlikely to have any effect on cash balance plan conversion
decision making. Therefore, the only way to predictably affect the
rate and terms of cash balance plan conversions is to substantively
regulate them. Based upon this insight, Part V discusses the cost
burdens that are associated with substantive regulation of
conversions to cash balance plans and considers the effect of those
burdens. Ironically, it will find that substantive regulation may
actually increase the costs borne by older workers.
I.

BACKGROUND ON CASH

BALANCE PLAN

CONVERSIONS

This section begins by examining cash balance plans and how
they differ from traditional pension plans. It will then explain
why employers choose to convert to cash balance plans. It will end
by discussing an analogous trend of plan changes, which occurred
during the 1980s.
A. Plan Typology
Until 1997, the most common employer-sponsored retirement
plan in the United States was a defined benefit (DB) plan.31 DB
plans promise benefits based on a formula, which often has years
of service and employee salary as key components. 32 For example,
problems raised by CB plans because of the existing regulatory structure);
Regina T. Jefferson, Striking a Balance in the Cash Balance Plan Debate, 49
BUFF. L. REV. 513, 562 (2001) (suggesting that changes in pension laws could
resolve problems with CB plan conversions); Edward A. Zelinsky, The Cash
Balance Controversy, 19 VA. TAX REV. 683, 761 (2000) (recommending changes
in statutory regulations to resolve the CB controversy).
31. PENSION BENEFIT GUARANTY CORPORATION, PENSION INSURANCE DATA
BOOK 1998, at 8 fig. 7 (1999) [hereinafter DATA BOOK] (showing that TDB
plans have traditionally been the provider of primary pension coverage).
32. MICHAEL J. CANAN, QUALIFIED RETIREMENT PLANS § 3.51 (2004 ed.
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a DB plan might provide for benefits at age sixty-five of 1.5% per
year of service multiplied by the employee's salary averaged over
the final five years of employment. At retirement, an employee
with thirty years of service and a final average salary of $50,000
per year would be entitled to an age sixty-five pension benefit of
$22,500 per year. 33 Since most DB plans pay benefits in the form
of an annuity, thus, the retiree receives lifetime monthly
Many DB plans also provide early retirement
benefits. 34
threshold,
incentives once employees reach an age and service
35
such as age fifty-five and twenty years of service.
In a DB plan, the employer bears the first tier of risk because
regardless of the performance of the plan's investments, the
employer36must fund the plan sufficiently to provide the promised
benefits.
The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation ("PBGC"), which
is funded with premiums paid by DB plan sponsors, bears the
second tier of risk because it guarantees payment of certain plan
benefits in case the employer defaults. 37 This article refers to
these traditional DB plans as TDB plans.
A second type of plan, known as a defined contribution ("DC")
plan, consists of individualized plan accounts established on behalf
of each participating employee. 38 The employee's ultimate benefit
is the value of her account-the sum of all contributions and
investment gains and losses. 39 Thus, the investment risk is on the
employee. Employers can avoid liability for investment decisions40
by delegating investment choices to individual participants.
Under a DC plan because of the way benefits are calculated the
plan's assets always equal its liabilities; therefore, they are not
insured by the PBGC. 41 DC plans typically permit the payment of
benefits to be made in the form of a lump sum. 42 All pension plans
2003).
33. (1.5% x 30 years of service) x $50,000 final average salary = $22,500.
34. CANAN, supra note 32, § 3.52. Participants' spouses also have rights in
determining the form of payment of DB plan benefits. Id. § 7.16.
35. DAN M. MCGILL & DONALD S. GRUBBS, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF PRIVATE
PENSIONS 131 (6th ed. 1989).
36. I.R.C. § 412 (2000). See CANAN, supra note 32, §§ 12.1-12.9 (providing a
thorough review of minimum funding standards).
37. DATA BOOK, supra note 31, at 1.
38. CANAN, supra note 32, § 3.11.
39. Id.
40. KPMG, RETIREMENT BENEFITS IN THE 1990S: 1997 SURVEY DATA 35-36
(1997).

41. But see Regina T. Jefferson, Rethinking the Risk of Defined
Contribution Plans, 4 FLA. TAX REV. 607, 681-82 (2000) (advocating the
establishment of an insurance program to protect a minimum investment
return on DC plan accounts).
42. AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ACTUARIES, FINANCING THE RETIREMENT OF

FUTURE

GENERATIONS

14

(1998),

at

2004]
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are either DB or DC plans.
43
Since the early 1980s, the number of DC plans has exploded.
Perhaps the most significant event contributing to their popularity
occurred in 1981 when the Treasury Department issued
regulations establishing the boundaries of what have come to be
known as "401(k) plans."44 These plans typically permit employees
to set aside part of their salary as retirement savings and decide
how to invest the funds. 45 Many employers also match some
portion of the employees' contributions, thereby encouraging plan
participation. 46 Although no 401(k) plans existed in 1979, by 2000
forty-six percent of all workers at firms with 100 or more
employees were entitled to participate in DC plans, such as 401(k)
plans. 47 Most new employers choose to offer a DC plan rather
than a DB plan. 48 The majority of growth in pension plans since
49
the 1970s has occurred in DC plans.
Cash balance ("CB") plans intersect the boundaries of TDB
and DC plans. Because of this duality, which is inherent in their
structure, CB plans are frequently referred to as hybrid plans. 50
http://www.actuary.org/pdf/pension/retirement.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2004).
See WORKING GROUP ON THE MERITS OF DEFINED
43. Id. at 12-13.
CONTRIBUTION vs. DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS WITH AN EMPHASIS ON SMALL
BUSINESS CONCERNS 1 (Dep't of Labor, ERISA Advisory Council 1997)
[hereinafter ERISA ADVISORY REPORT ON DC VS. DB PLANS] (noting the
movement from DB plans to DC plans).
44. JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, PENSION AND EMPLOYEE
BENEFIT LAW 50 (2d ed. 1995).
45. Id. at 49-50
46. Id. at 50.
47. Purcell, supra note 22, at CRS-1 table 1.
48. Hearing Before the Subcommitte on Employer-Employee Relations
Before the House Education and the Workforce Subcommittee, 106th Cong. 5
(2000) (statement of Leslie B. Kramerich, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Pension and
Welfare Benefits Admin. U.S. Dep't of Labor) (stating "[t]he most significant
trend in the employment-based private pension system has been the
The number of
increasing significance of defined contribution plans.
participants in these plans has grown from fewer than 12 million in 1975 to 40
million in 1998").
49. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS:
IMPROVING WORKER COVERAGE AND BENEFITS 7 fig. 1 (Apr. 2002), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d02225.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2004). See
UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PRIVATE PENSIONS: MOST
EMPLOYERS THAT OFFER PENSIONS USE DEFINED CONTRIBUTION PLANS 2
(1996), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/1997/gg97001.pdf (last visited
Mar. 2, 2004) (finding that between 1984 and 1993, of those employers that
sponsored pension plans, the percentage that offered only a DC plan had
increased from 68% to 88%).
50. KYLE N. BROWN ET AL., THE UNFOLDING OF A PREDICTABLE SURPRISE:
A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE SHIFT FROM TRADITIONAL PENSIONS TO
available
at
1
(2000),
PLANS
HYBRID
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/research/deliverpdf.asp?
catalog=W-326&id--x.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2004) (referring to CB and
pension equity plans as "hybrid defined benefit plans"); Advisory Council
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As a technical matter, CB plans are a subset of DB plans because
they promise participants a benefit based on a formula and do not
provide actual individual accounts for plan participants. 51 CB
plans look very much like DC plans because the promised benefit
tends to be based on the same two components as the typical DC
plan.
One component, the "pay component," is typically in the form
of an annual contribution equaling a percentage of the
participant's compensation. 52
The second component, the
"investment component," provides for an investment return based
on a defined rate.5 3 The investment component may be either a
fixed rate or it may correspond to well-known rates, such as those
54
identified on U.S. Treasury instruments.
Thus, CB plan benefits are communicated to employees as a
series of individual entitlements based on pay and investment
return components, as in DC plans. The difference, however, is
that individual plan accounts are strictly hypothetical in a CB
plan. No actual employee accounts are established and the plan
captures any positive difference between the promised investment
return and the actual return. On the other hand, as with a DB
plan, the first tier of investment risk remains on employers
because they must fund the plan sufficiently to pay promised
benefits, and make up any difference if the promised investment
returns exceed the actual investment returns. Since CB plans are
a species of DB plans and make commitments of specific benefits
to participants, the PBGC insures them providing a second tier of
protection. CB plans typically provide for the payment of benefits
in the form of either an annuity or a lump sum at the option of the
5
benefit recipients.
B. Employer Conversions to Cash Balance Plans
This section will detail the factors leading employers to
convert their established TDB plans to CB plans. It begins by
examining the motivations as reported by the employers
Report, supra note 9 (referring to "Cash Balance and Other Hybrid Plans").
51. I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359, *1 (stating that "a cash balance
plan is a defined benefit pension plan"); CANAN, supra note 32, § 3.52[E].
52. CANAN, supra note 32, § 3.52[E].
53. Id.
54. Advisory Council Report, supra note 10.
55. See I.R.S. Notice 96-8, 1996-1 C.B. 359, *2 (stating that "[m]ost cash
balance plans also are designed to permit, after termination of employment, a
distribution of an employee's entire accrued benefit in the form of a single sum
distribution equal to the employee's hypothetical account balance as of the
date of the distribution"); Advisory Council Report, supra note 9 (explaining
that CB plan benefits "are presumptively payable as an annuity"); BROWN,
supra note 50, at 3 (indicating that CB plans "frequently offer[ ] the lump sum
as a primary form of benefit distribution").
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Next, it discusses the effect that demographic
themselves.
changes in the workforce may have on plan sponsorship. Finally,
it concludes with an analysis of the role played by pension plan
funding regulations and plan costs.
1. Reported Motivations for Plan Conversions
A prominent survey, summarized in Table 1, inquired into the
primary motivations reported by employers who switched from a
TDB to a CB plan. The top three factors all reflect employer
frustration based on the long-held belief that employees tend not
to understand or properly value their employee benefit plans,
particularly pension plans. 56 According to the survey, employers
believe that: (a) lump sum values are easier to communicate to
employees than annuity values; (b) employees understand large
lump sum balances better than they understand the value of a
a higher value on
future annuity stream; and (c) employees place
57
lump sum balances than on annuity streams.

Table 1:

Top Four Factors Identified as
Important by Employers Who Have
Undertaken Plan Conversions

Factors
Improves employees'
appreciation of plan
Facilitates communications
Ability to show lump sum values
Aids in recruitment

Percentageof
All Respondents

96.0
93.0
93.0
80.858

Logically, the fourth factor, "aids in recruitment," also relates
to the perceived differential between employees' understanding
and valuation of CB plans as compared to TDB plans. Assume
that an employer would incur equal costs in sponsoring either Plan
X, a TDB plan, or Plan Y, a CB plan. 59 If, because of the first three
factors listed in the survey, a recruit places a higher value on the
benefits provided by Plan Y than those provided by Plan X, then
the potential employer has reason to prefer Plan Y.
However, the alternatives to CB plans give rise to some
56. BROWN, supra note 50, at 44.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 44 table 19.
59. See infra notes 89-95 and accompanying text (discussing the data on
how conversions from TDB to CB plans affect plan costs).
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skepticism as to whether employers are accurately reporting their
motivations for plan conversions. One reason employers give to
support their plan conversions is that employees prefer or better
understand lump sum account balances as compared to annuities.
However, nothing prevents a TDB plan from calculating the
current value of a participant's accrued annuity benefit and
reporting the value to the participant as part of the normal benefit
statements. 60 Surely, such an addition to the plan's disclosure
statements would be a simpler way to address the perceived
problem than to undertake a complete restructuring of the plan,
which is what a CB conversion requires. Similarly, any TDB plan
can provide terminating employees with the option of receiving a
61
lump sum distribution.
2.

The Effect of Demographic Changes in the U.S. Workforce

Whether viewed as subtext in the concerns that employers
report with recruitment, 62 or through a more skeptical lens,
indications point to the demography of today's workforce as a
factor in the rate of CB plan conversions. Due to the nature of the
TDB plan benefit formula, which considers both years of service
and final average salary, a significant portion of an employee's
benefits tends to be accrued in the final years of employment. 63 In
contrast, employees accrue CB plan assets more evenly over their
entire working career. Therefore, employees earn higher benefits
at younger ages in a CB plan as compared to a TDB plan.
In fact, some data indicate that the difference is so significant
that CB plans may actually reverse the traditional pattern of
earning retirement benefits.
According to preliminary data
gathered by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), a thirty-year employee will earn approximately fifty
percent of her total retirement benefit in her final ten to twelve
years of work in a TDB plan. 64 In contrast, under a CB plan, an
employee with thirty years of service would only accrue
approximately twenty percent of his total retirement benefit
during his last ten to twelve years of work. 65 The CB employee
60. Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 707-09.
61. See id. (noting the redistribution of benefits under the two approaches).
See also CANAN, supra note 32, § 7.16 (noting election of the lump sum option
may require spousal consent).
62. See supra note 58 and accompanying table (describing selected
employer motivations to shift to hybrid plans).
63. See Colleen T. Congel, EEOC Director Offers PreliminaryData on Cash
Balance Age DiscriminationReview, 27 PENS. & BEN. REP. (BNA) 1333 (2000)
(discussing a letter from the EEOC chairwoman to Senator Charles E.
Grassley noting the detrimental impact to older workers in cash balance
conversions).
64. Id.
65. Id.

20041
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would accrue approximately fifty percent of his benefit during his
66
first twelve years of employment.
This reversal in the pattern of accruals illustrates one way in
which older employees are disadvantaged by a CB plan conversion.
Older employees who are still working at the time of the
conversion worked for a relatively low rate of pension accruals
under the TDB plan when they were young. They expected, based
on the terms of the plan, to earn dramatically higher rates of
accruals during their later years of employment. In the absence of
any mitigating provisions, when an employer converts to a CB
plan, those older workers get the worst of both plans. They earned
the low accrual rates under the traditional plan during their early
working years and they complete their job tenure by earning the
67
lower rate of accruals under the CB plan.
Some plan conversions also decrease benefits for older
employees through a mechanism known as a "wearaway." When
an employer converts its plan to a CB plan, depending on the
assumptions used, older employees may have initial balances in
the CB plan that are lower than their existing benefit under the
TDB plan. Since ERISA prohibits plans from decreasing vested
accrued benefits, the employees' existing benefits cannot actually
be decreased. However, some plan conversions, in effect, freeze
the employees' benefits until the employee works long enough to
'wearaway' the difference between the TDB plan benefit and the
CB plan benefit. For example, assume the current value on the
date of plan conversion of a fifty-five year old employee's TDB plan
benefit is $87,582 and the current value of the new CB plan
benefit is $66,677.68 That employee has a wearaway of $20,905.69
Given reasonable assumptions, the employee will need to work
more than eight years before the employee's pension benefit
increases above the $87,582 she earned under the traditional plan
70
as of the date of conversion.
The third way in which a conversion to a CB plan may
disadvantage older, long-service workers is by eliminating

66. Id.
67. Id. See The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 1 (statement of
Karen Ferguson, Director of The Pension Rights Center) (noting that plan
conversions deprive older employees of expected accrual rates).
68. The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 8 (statement of Joseph
Perkins, former President the American Association of Retired Persons).
69. Id.
70. Id. The example assumes annual compensation of $40,000, age sixtytwo as the normal retirement age, a 5% annual pay credit, annual salary
increases of 5%, both an interest rate and a discount rate of 6%, and GATT
mortality tables. Id. See Jonathan Barry Forman & Amy Nixon, Cash
Balance Pension Plan Conversions, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 379, 403-05

(2000) (providing a more detailed discussion of the causes and possible effects
of wearaways).
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subsidized early retirement benefits.
As in the foregoing
examples, employees who are on the verge of becoming entitled to
subsidized early retirements, usually by reaching age and service
thresholds, will experience a substantial blow to their retirement
income expectations if those benefits are eliminated. 71 When
combined' with decreased accrual rates and the possibility of
wearaways, the effect of the loss of anticipated early retirement
benefits becomes magnified.
Thus, depending on the plan
conversion and the particular circumstances of individual
employees, any or all three of these factors might contribute to
what an individual perceives as a loss of expected benefits.
None of the dilatory effects just discussed-decreased rates of
accruals, wearaways and elimination of subsidized early
retirement benefits-are necessary results of CB plan conversions.
Employers can choose to structure plan conversions in ways that
protect the expectations of older employees. 72 Kodak is frequently
cited as an employer that fully protected all of the participants in
its TDB plan from any negative effects when it converted to a CB
plan. 73
IBM after facing strong levels of employee dissent,
unionizing efforts and negative publicity, just before a scheduled
Senate hearing on the issue, gave all its employees over age forty
who had at least ten years of IBM service at the time of the
conversion the option of choosing between the traditional plan and
the revised plan.74 Still, some IBM employees who were under age
forty, or were employed for less than ten years at IBM as of the
date of the plan conversion, expect to receive lower pension
benefits under the CB plan than they would have earned under
the traditional plan. 75 Numerous other employers elected not to
76
grandfather older workers at the time of plan conversion.

71. Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 699-702. ERISA and the IRC both impose
some limit on the extent to which employers may defeat early retirement
expectations. ERISA § 204(g), 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (2000); I.R.C. § 411(d)(6)
(2000). See LANGBEIN & WOLK, supra note 44, at 142-44 (discussing ERISA
amendments limiting an employer's ability to eliminate or redress certain
retirement benefits).
72. Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 697-99.
73. Norman Stein, Some Serious Questions About Cash Balance Plans,
CONTINGENCIES, Sept./Oct. 1999, at 28, 32.
74. Letter from Daniel E. O'Donnell, Vice President and Secretary, IBM, to
IBM Stockholders 4 (Apr. 11, 2000) (available in SEC's EDGAR database as
IBM's Definitive Proxy Statement, filed Apr. 11, 2000).
75. Id. See Hybrid Pension Plans, supra note 6, at 40 (1999) (statement of
Janet Krueger, spokesperson for IBM Employee Benefits Action Coalition)

(representing group of IBM employees formed in July 1999 to convince IBM to
restore pension benefits for 100% of vested employees).
76. The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 3 (statement of James
A. Bruggeman, Employee of Central and South West Corporation) (explaining
that he lost approximately 30% of the value of his expected pension as a result
of the company's conversion to a CB plan); Lee A. Sheppard, The Down-Aging
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CB plans tend to be more attractive than TDB plans to
younger workers with relatively short job tenures because of the
difference in accrual patterns and payment options. In the era
when large corporations worked to reduce workforce turnover, and
the employer and employees ideally sought lifetime employment,
large employers tended to sponsor TDB plans. 77 By heavily
weighing benefits accrual towards older, long-term employees,
78
TDB plans supported the goal of long-term employment.
However, changing employment patterns and nontraditional work
arrangements make TDB plans less attractive to employers.
Instead, for educated, technically skilled employees who have
shorter-term job expectations, CB plans are more efficient than
TDB plans in providing benefits to that group of workers.
Two characteristics make CB plans more attractive than TDB
plans to certain workers. First, younger workers accumulate
benefits more quickly under CB plans than they could under TDB
plans. Second, the lump sum benefit option typically provided by
CB plans makes those benefits more portable than the annuitystyle benefits normally provided by TDB plans. To the extent that
an employer with an existing TDB plan wants to maximize the
attractiveness of its plan to younger, mobile workers, it would be
79
reasonable for it to convert to a CB plan.
3.

The Influence of Plan FundingRegulation and Plan Costs

The demographic changes that are occurring as the U.S.
workforce ages can dramatically increase the costs of a TDB plan.
ERISA imposes both minimum and maximum funding standards
on pension plan sponsors.8 0 The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 198781 decreased employers' flexibility in pre-funding their
pension plans by mandating that an employer could only make
tax-deductible contributions until its plan became funded at
between 150 and 170% of current liability. 82 Essentially, this
of Pension Plans, 82 TAX NOTES 171, 173 (Jan. 11, 1999) (referring to Bank of
America's plan conversion).
77. The number of defined benefit plans peaked in 1985 at approximately
112,000.
78. Peter T. Scott, A National Retirement Income Policy, 44 TAX NOTES 913,
919 (1989).
79. Changing from a TDB to a DC plan would accomplish many of the same
goals, but would be subject to significant tax penalties. See infra notes 237241 and accompanying text.
80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1081-1086 (2000); I.R.C. § 412 (2000).
81. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203,
§ 9303, 101 Stat. 1330-33 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 412).
82. ERISA Advisory Report on DC vs. DB Plans, supra note 43, at 8-9. See
Regina T. Jefferson, Defined Benefit Plan Funding: How Much is Too Much?,
44 CASE W. RES. 1 (1993) (discussing private pension plan funding rules).
EGTRRA phased in more flexibility for employer contributions, but sunsets in
2010. EGTRRA §§ 651-652.
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limitation only permitted a TDB plan's obligations to be calculated
on workers' current salaries and job tenures.8 3 Thus, it slowed
funding for the benefits of the baby boom generation, who were
between the ages of twenty-three and forty-one when the
legislation was enacted.8 4 In addition, because plan-funding
obligations were recalculated according to the new limitations,
many plans had assets in excess of the funding limitations.8 5 Plan
sponsors, therefore, were precluded from making additional taxdeductible contributions.
As the substantial set of baby boom workers approach
retirement age under a TDB plan, the funding obligation increases
rapidly, reflecting the estimate that workers earn approximately
fifty percent of their benefits during their final ten to twelve years
of employment.8 6 The data on the relationship between funding
issues and plan conversions are somewhat inconsistent. More
than sixty percent of those employers who have converted to a CB
plan report that stability and management of plan expenses was a
factor in the conversion decision.8 7 One data study comparing
funding status with plan conversions found only a weak
88
relationship between the funding patterns and conversions.
However, looking only at those plans that have converted,
funding status of the prior TDB plan does appear relevant. The
ERISA Advisory Council estimated that approximately 95% of the
existing CB plans were established through the conversion of
overfunded TDB plans.8 9
Similarly, some opponents of CB plans allege that employers
engage in plan conversions to decrease pension plan costs. 90
Anecdotally, one litigated case supports this allegation because the
employer began its assessment of its DB plan options and
ultimately converted to a CB plan after learning that legislative
changes would cause its plan expenses to increase between
$750,000 and $2,000,000 in the first year alone. 91 The data from a
detailed conversions study illustrates some of the difficulties in

83. Jefferson, supra note 82, at 13-14.
84. BROWN, supra note 50, at 12.
85. Id.; ERISA Advisory Report on DC vs. DB Plans,supra note 43, at 8.
86. See supra note 64 and accompanying text (citing EEOC data on heavy
back end accrual of retirement benefits).
87. BROWN, supra note 50, at 45. See Hybrid Pension Plans, supra note 6,
at 151-62 (statement of Jack VanDerhei, Temple University and Fellow,
Employee Benefit Research Institute) (listing additional funding flexibility as
one of the positive attributes of a CB plan).
88. BROWN, supra note 50, at 14-15.
89. Advisory Council Report, supra note 10.
90. The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 9 (statement of Joseph,
former President of the American Association of Retired Persons); Sheppard,
supra note 76, at 171; Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 705-07, 709-15.
91. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 819.

20041.

Disclosure and Cash Balance Plans

evaluating the extent to which cost savings is an important factor
in conversion decisions. The study found that conversions do tend
to reduce costs in the converted plan. 92 The same study found that
many employers who convert to a CB plan either establish or
enhance a DC plan. 93 As a result, the survey predicted that the
total impact of plan conversions on pension plan costs will "be so
negligible in aggregate that the shift in plan designs overall can be
characterized as cost-neutral."9 4
Even when an employer
maintains plan expenses at the same level after a conversion, the
typical accrual pattern means that the change to a CB plan will
95
shift benefits from older to younger workers.
Thus, the effect of a plan conversion decreases the pension
costs associated with older, long service employees. As discussed
above, 96 the negative effects that CB plan conversions tend to have
on older employees are not necessarily inherent in the conversions.
Employers can structure conversions in order to negate any costs
that otherwise would be imposed on older employees. 97 To the
extent that employers do not elect to implement conversions in
ways that protect older employees, they have implicitly decided to
decrease their pension expenditures for older employees. 98
In sum, data indicate several factors leading to the conversion
of TDB plans to CB plans. They include: (1) enhanced plan
communication and increased employee appreciation of the
pension plan; (2) a more attractive benefit package for the
recruitment of new employees, particularly younger, more mobile
workers; (3) the shift of plan benefits from older, longer-term
employees to younger, shorter-term employees; (4) cost savings;
and (5) funding flexibility. Not all of these factors are necessarily
considered in every plan conversion. Employers also have the
opportunity to minimize the negative effects of a plan conversion
on older employees who are working at the time of the conversion.
C. Plan Reversions of the 1980s
During the 1980s, a trend analogous to that of CB conversions
92. BROWN, supra note 50, at 18-20.
93. Id. at 18-19.
94. Id. at 18. See Survey of Cash Balance Conversions, CASH BALANCE
NOTES,
May
2000,
at
1,
3,
available
at
http://www.pwcglobal.com/Extweb/ncsurvres.nsf/docid/
7C89EE478C4CD479853568FB00721096/$file/cashbal.pdf (last visited Mar.
29, 2004)(reporting 67% of respondents expected long term pension costs to be
equal or greater to pre-conversion costs).
95. Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 707-08.
96. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing how a CB
plan conversion may disadvantage older workers).
97. See Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 697-99 (discussing how employers can
lessen the impact of a plan conversion for older employees).
98. Id.
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occurred when employers terminated TDB plans holding tens of
billions of dollars in assets and replaced some of them with DC
plans.
By the early 1980s, numerous TDB pension plans
accumulated assets in excess of the projected future benefit
obligations. 99 In fact, one economist at the Stanford Business
School estimated that by 1980, pension plan overfunding reached
almost $50 billion and continued to increase over the next five
years. 100 Whether the overfunding was attributable to aggressive
funding of plans, a rising stock market, higher than expected
interest rates, or conservative actuarial assumptions, 0 1 many plan
trust funds appeared generously funded even when calculated on
10 2
an ongoing basis.
An employer could, while acting within the bounds of the law,
recapture those excess plan assets by terminating its pension plan.
Typically, the employer next established a DC plan as its
continuing plan. In such a termination, the TDB plan was
required to purchase annuities to pay participants their accrued
benefits. 03 The employer could then recoup the excess assets
remaining in the plan trust. With billions of dollars in excess plan
assets, many employers chose to do exactly that during the 1980s.
Between 1980 and 1987, looking only at reversions of $1 million or
more, 10 4 employers recovered more than $18 billion, or more than
forty-five percent of the total assets of the 1,635 affected plans. 0 5
On average, each employer receiving one of these reversions
recouped more than $11 million while the plan participants, the
99. Mark Daniels, Pensions in Peril: Single Employer Pension Plan
Terminations in the Context of Corporate Bankruptcies, 9 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J.
25, 37-38 (1991); Kris Wehrmeister, Note, Early Retirement Benefits and Gillis
v. Hoechst Celanese Corp.: Same Desk, Same Job, So What?, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 475, 510 n.317 (1995).
100. Overfunded Pension Plans: Joint Hearing Before the House Select
Comm. on Aging and the House Subcomm. on Labor-Mgmt. Relations of the
Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 99th Cong. 257 (1985) [hereinafter Overfunded
Pension Hearings] (statement of Jeremy Bulow, Stanford Business School).
101. PBGC Warns House Oversight Panel to Move Cautiously on Asset
Reversion, 191 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) A-10 (Oct. 3, 1988).
102. Another way to calculate liabilities is on the basis of a plan's obligations
if it were to be immediately terminated. Using that approach frequently
reduces expected liabilities and increases the amount of excess plan assets.
See Norman P. Stein, Reversions from Pension Plans: History, Policies, and
Prospects, 44 TAX L. REV. 259, 273-76 (1989) (discussing the difference
between a plan's funding obligations at termination and on a continuing
basis).
103. In the termination of a fully funded plan, all accrued benefits must be
vested. I.R.C. § 411(d)(3) (2000).
104. The PGBG only keeps statistics on pension plans reversions of at least
$1 million. Stein, supra note 102, at 259 n.2.
105. Dana M. Muir, Changing the Rules of the Game: Pension Plan
Terminations and Early Retirement Benefits, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1034, 1036
(1989).
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nominal "plan beneficiaries," each received an average, total
distribution of slightly more than $12,000.106
This
termination
and recoupment
of assets
was
unprecedented. In comparison, during 1979 employers terminated
10 7
ten overfunded plans, which held total assets of $18 million.
Additionally, the focus on large reversions significantly
understated the scope of the plans affected because reversions
occurred in both small and large plans. The PBGC's own
estimates indicate that excess assets existed in a minimum of
4,800 of the 6,800 plans terminated during 1986.108
Two particular reversions provide a sense of the diversity of
effects experienced by plan participants. The first occurred when
the purchasers of the Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company
(A&P) terminated its pension plan, recovering an excess greater
than what they paid for the entire company. 0 9 A&P experienced
severe financial difficulties during that time. Therefore, some
argued that dipping into the pension funds was necessary to the
survival of A&P and possibly preserving jobs.110 In such a case,
rational workers might be willing to trade future accruals of
pension benefits and the associated retirement security for the
continuation of their employment.
However, the picture in many reversions was quite different.
When Texaco Inc. bought Getty Oil Co. in 1984, it terminated
Getty's pension plan.'
Texaco recovered about $250 million in
excess assets, which represented a small portion of the $10.3
billion purchase price, to retire some of the debt incurred in the
acquisition.11 2
The affected employees and retirees reacted
vociferously 1 3 and their objections highlight the concerns raised
by plan terminations. Those becoming active employees of Texaco

106. Id.
107. Overfunded Pension Plans, supra note 100, at 127, 129 (Briefing
Materials on Plan Terminations and Asset Reversions to Employers prepared
by the House Select Comm. on Aging).
108. Amicus Curiae Brief for the Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. at 3, Mead
Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714 (1989) (No. 87-1868).
109.

KAREN FERGUSON & KATE BLACKWELL, PENSIONS IN CRISIS 122 (1995).

110. Id.
111. PBGC Warns House Oversight Panel to Move Cautiously on Asset
Reversion, supra note 101, at A-10.
112. Overfunded Pension Plans, supra note 100, at 33 (statement of Arthur

Wilson, President, Local 898, The Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l
Union); Id. at 298 (Letter of Leroy V. Scott, Chairman, Delaware Getty
Retirement Group).

113. Of course this was not the only issue litigated as a result of Texaco's
purchase of Getty. For discussions of Texaco's battle with Pennzoil over
alleged inducement of breach of contract, see THOMAS PETZINGER, OIL &
HONOR: THE TEXACO-PENNZOIL WARS (1987) and BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG
DEAL 189-92 (1998).
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also became participants in Texaco's pension plan."1
Their
complaint echoes the complaints of today's older workers whose
TDB plans convert to CB plans. Workers ultimately received
lower benefits than they expected under the Getty plan. 1 5
The cohort of retirees had other complaints. 116 After its
termination, the Getty plan would no longer be available to pay
the benefits promised to current retirees. Therefore, Texaco
provided for those payments by purchasing annuities in
accordance with ERISA."1 However, because the amount of each
annuity was established at the time of purchase, no provision was
made for cost of living increases.11s Retirees thus lost expected
increases in their benefits, expectations based upon Getty's history
of voluntarily and periodically increasing pensions to counter
inflationary effects. 119 Retiree groups also expressed concern
because the PBGC, which insures DB plans, did not insure against
the default of annuities purchased when a plan terminated. 120 A
union official argued that an annuity provider would have less of a
sense of moral obligation to the plan participants than would the
plan sponsor. 12' This did not become a problem for the Getty
retirees, but the insolvency of Executive Life in late 1991122 proved
that annuities do pose a risk. Executive Life's default left
numerous former participants, whose terminated plans had
purchased annuities from Executive Life, with less than their full
promised annuities and without PBGC protection. 123

114. PBGC Warns House Oversight Panel to Move Cautiously on Asset
Reversion, supra note 101, at A-10.
115. Id.
116. Finally, both retirees and active employees objected to the relatively low
interest rates used by Texaco to calculate the interest due on the return of
participant contributions. Overfunded Pension Plans, supra note 100, at 33
(statement of Arthur Wilson, President, The Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers
Int'l Union); id. at 298 (Letter of Leroy V. Scott, Chairman Delaware Getty
Retirement Group).
117. Id. at 299 (Letter of Leroy V. Scott, Chairman Delaware Getty
Retirement Group).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 34 (statement of Arthur Wilson, President, The Oil, Chemical &
Atomic Workers Int'l Union).
122. In re Unisys Sav. Plan Litig., 173 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 1999).
123. See, e.g., Waller v. Blue Cross, 32 F.3d 1337, 1339 (9th Cir. 1994)
(addressing claims against plan fiduciaries who selected Executive Life as
annuity provider upon termination of plan); Pilkington PLC v. Perelman, 72
F.3d 1396, 1397 (9th Cir. 1994) (alleging fiduciary breach in connection with
selection of Executive Life as annuity provider upon plan termination and
referring to DOL's interest because the "Secretary is [a] plaintiff in a number
of other actions seeking to recover benefits for beneficiaries of plans damaged
by Executive Life's collapse"); Maher v. Strachan Shipping Co., No. 92-2834,
1996 WL 257566, at *2 (E.D. La. May 14, 1996) (regarding claim against plan
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As is true of the current trend of TDBoto CB plan conversions,
the TDB plan terminations of the 1980s captured an unusual
amount of attention as pension plan changes go. The enormous
dollar amounts involved in many of the reversions, their possible
role in the accelerating merger and acquisition frenzy, and the
potential effect on retirement security spawned critical journal
articles, 124 attention in the popular press, 125 and congressional
126
hearings.
In another parallel with conversions, plan terminations and
reversions generated substantial litigation as employees fought for
a greater share of the assets from terminating plans.
But,
127
whether basing claims on theories of reasonable expectations,
ERISA's requirement that fiduciaries act for the exclusive benefit

sponsor alleging fiduciary breach based upon insolvency of insurance company
that issued annuity contracts). See also In re Unisys Sav., 173 F.3d at 150
(considering issues associated with Executive Life's default on Guaranteed
Insurance Contracts); Texas Life, Accident, Health & Hosp. Serv. Ins. Guar.
Ass'n v. Gaylord Entm't Co., 105 F.3d 210, 213-14 (5th Cir. 1997); Honeywell,
Inc. v. Minn. Life & Health Ins. Guar. Ass'n., 110 F.3d 547, 549-50 (8th Cir
1997); Bussian v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 21 F. Supp. 2d 680, 685-86 (S.D. Tex.
1998).
124. See Dennis R. Coleman, From Amato to Blessitt: Out of the Frying Pan,
Into the Fire, 15 TAX MGMT. COMPENSATION PLAN. J. (BNA) 343 (1987);

Donald S. Grubbs, Jr., Termination of Pension Plans With Asset Reversion: A
Solution, 10 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 199 (1984); Richard A. Ippolito,
Issues Surrounding Pension Terminations for Reversions, 5 AM. J. TAX POLY.
81 (1986); Bruce J. McNeil & John P. Griffin, Rules on Reversions Reexamined,
13 J. PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 291 (1987); Muir, supra note 105, at 1134;

Martin A. Pepper & Jeffrey A. Perlmuter, Accessibility of Surplus Pension
Assets, 9 J. OF PENS. PLAN. & COMPLIANCE 229 (1983); John H. Abbott,

Comment, LegislatingReversions:A Mistaken Path Leading to DrasticResults,
26 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1109 (1989); Carl A. Butler, Note, Pension Plan
Terminations and Asset Reversions: Accommodating the Interests of Employers
and Employees, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 257 (1985); Charles F. Royster, How
Does the Blessitt Decision Affect Plan Sponsors?, PENSION WORLD, Nov. 1987,
at 52.
125. See David E. Barry & Richard W. Brady, Business Forum: The Pension
Problem: Let Pension Funds Help Companies, Too, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1988,
at A2; Elizabeth Ehrlich, AMF's Agony Over Tapping the Pension Till, Bus.
WK., Jan. 21, 1985, at 97; Karen Friedman, Business Forum: Fulfilling the
Pension Promise; Without Reversion, Business Won't Play, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
28, 1986, at C2.

126. See Corporate Raiding of Worker Pension Plans: Hearings Before the
Employment & Housing Subcomm. of the House Comm. of Gov't Operations,
100th Cong. (2d Sess. 1988); Overfunded Pension Plans, supra note 100;
Pension Asset Raids: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 98th
Cong. (1st Sess. 1983).
127. Van Orman v. Am. Ins. Co., 680 F.2d 301, 307-08 (3d Cir. 1982). See
Jennifer L. Pratt, Note, Reversion of Surplus Pension Assets Upon Plan
Termination: Is It Consistent With the Purpose of ERISA?, 62 IND. L.J. 805,
811-13 (1987) (discussing the reasonable expectancies argument in reference
to Van Orman).
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of plan participants, 128 traditional trust law concepts, 129 invalidity
of a plan amendment granting the plan sponsor entitlement to the

3
excess,' 30 or truncated entitlement to early retirement benefits,' '
employees almost invariably lost their battles for some share of
the excess assets.
Faced with widespread concerns about unfairness and
impingement upon benefit expectations and in the face of the
employees' failed legal challenges, Congress responded to concerns
that plan assets should be preserved. In order to discourage
employers from terminating plans, in 1986 they took their first
step by imposing a ten percent tax on reversions. 132 In 1988, the
tax increased to fifteen percent, 33 and then in 1990 it was raised
to the current level of twenty percent. 34 The 1990 changes also, in
effect, added an additional thirty percent tax, resulting in net tax
of fifty percent if an employer terminated a plan without creating
35
a qualified successor plan.
Over the same period, an economic slowdown, problems in the
junk bond markets and rising interest rates, converged to slow the
market for mergers and acquisitions. This substantially slowed
the pace of asset reversions for pension plans and increased tax
revenues through the collection of the excise tax on those
reversions that occurred. Reversion activity began to decline in
1988 and has stayed significantly below the level of the early- and
mid-eighties. 136 However, the imposition of significant excise taxes
is a controversial situation.
By merging overfunded and
underfunded plans, plan sponsors remain able to capture surplus
assets. 37 More seriously, the effective unavailability of the
surplus combined with contemporaneous limitations imposed on

128. Holliday v. Xerox Corp., 732 F.2d 548, 550 (6th Cir. 1984). See Pratt,
supra note 127, at 815-18 (discussing the exclusive benefit argument).
129. See Borst v. Chevron Corp., 36 F.3d 1308, 1315-16 (5th Cir. 1994).
130. See Riley v. Murdock, 825 F. Supp. 1215 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (finding no
breach of fiduciary duty associated with plan amendment).
131. See Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 927 F.2d 756 (4th Cir. 1991). For extensive
analysis of the early retirement issue, see Muir, supra note 105.
132. Tax Reform Act of 1986, § 86, Pub. L. 99-514, § 4972(a), 100 Stat. 2085,
2478 (1986).
133. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647,
§§ 12001, 12002(a), 102 Stat. 3342, 3702 (1988).
134. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388 (1990).
135. Id.
136. Jeffrey N. Gordon, Employees, Pensions, and The New Economic Order,
97 COLUM. L. REv. 1519, 1544 (1997); Lee G. Knight, et al., An Application of
the Analytic Hierarchy Process to Tax Policy Decisions: The Termination of
Overfunded Pension Plans, 12 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 101, 111 (1995). See Pension
Benefit Guaranty Corporation, 1995 Annual Report (1996). But see Jefferson,
supra note 82, at 18 (arguing that business considerations, not the availability
of reversions, are responsible for most voluntary plan terminations).
137. Gordon, supra note 136, at 1544.
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plan funding tend to discourage employers from advance funding
and may result in plans being unable to meet their benefit
obligations. 138 Since employers retain the obligation to fully fund
a DB plan should investment returns not meet expectations, some
commentators argue that notions of plan "ownership," the balance
of risk and reward and simple fairness, militate in favor of
employers being able to realize any excess that results from
unexpectedly favorable investment returns.1 39 Otherwise, the
effect is to discourage the sponsorship of DB plans so that an
employer chooses between offering no plan at all or providing a DC
140
plan, which raises other concerns.
There are substantial parallels between the current
conversions and the terminations of the 1980s. In both situations
the changes primarily occur in overfunded TDB plans. In each
case, the employees who tend to experience a loss of benefits are
older, long service workers who feel that the employer is not
keeping its side of the TDB plan bargain. As employees lost their
legal challenges to the conversions, they turned to Congress. Like
the 1980s, Congress will have to balance the employees'
complaints of unfairness with the basic structure of the domestic
pension plan system, allowing employers to choose the terms of
the plans they offer or not to offer any plans at all. Before
discussing these overarching systemic and policy issues it is first
necessary to analyze the legal and ethical challenges raised
against CB plan conversions, and examine the expected effects of
enhanced disclosure requirements.
II.

LEGAL AND ETHICAL CHALLENGES TO CASH BALANCE PLANS

Opponents of CB plans allege that the plans violate a variety
of substantive legal standards.
Specifically, suits have been
premised on breaches of federal and state age discrimination
laws,141 technical IRC and ERISA requirements governing pension
plans, 142 and ERISA fiduciary issues.14 3 Claims of an ethical
nature have also been brought to bear against the plan
conversions.144 While these issues are not central to this article, a
brief discussion is useful in order to understand the existing
regulatory structure. After all, the vehemence, posturing, and
arrogance of the discourse associated with these issues is more

138. Jefferson, supra note 82, at 3-4; Knight, supra note 136, at 111-12.
139. Knight, supra note 136, at 111-12.

140. Id.
141. See infra Part II.A.1 (discussing the legal challenge of age
discrimination).
142. See infra notes 174-210 and accompanying text (discussing the impact
of the Cooper case).
143. See infra notes 211-219 and accompanying text (discussing CB plans).
144. See infra Part II.B (discussing ethical challenges to cash balance plans).
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than a little unusual in the world of pension planning.
A.
1.

Legal Challenges

ADEA Issues

ADEA prohibits employers with twenty or more employees
from discriminating in terms of employment against individuals
who are age forty or older. 14
More specifically for present
purposes, ADEA prohibits benefit plans from decreasing benefit
accruals based on age. 146 A threshold question is whether the
147
ADEA prohibition on reducing benefit accruals because of age
protects individuals who have not reached normal retirement age.
While the ADEA does not contain any explicit provision limiting
its retirement accrual protections to those who are at least normal
retirement age, 148 one district court held that the import of the
statutory language and legislative history provide the basis for
such a limitation. 149 However, no other court to date has accepted
this argument.
Critics of CB plans raise two more compelling ADEA
arguments against the plans. First, they allege that the total
annual plan contribution, defined as the sum of the pay component
and investment return component, is smaller for older plan
participants than for otherwise equally situated younger
participants. 150 Thus, all CB plans inherently violate ADEA. For
example, assume that a plan provides for a ten percent annual pay
component and a four percent investment component.
If two
participants have equal salaries and have been at the employer
the same number of years, but one employee is younger than the
other, the investment component provision will cause that
employee to accrue a higher benefit in any given year than the
older employee. Because the younger employee has more years to
work until she reaches normal retirement age than the older
employee, her investment component of any given year's plan

145. 20 U.S.C. § 623 (2000).
146. 29 U.S.C. § 623(i) (2000).
147. A similar question could be raised regarding the corresponding ERISA
and IRC provisions. For a discussion of those provisions, see infra notes 174210 and accompanying text.
148. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 826-27.
149. Id. at 827-29. See Richard C. Shea et al., Age Discriminationin Cash
Balance Plans: Another View, 19 VA. TAX REV. 763, 768 (2000) (stating
"[i]ndeed, at one point the legislative history suggests that the rules are not
intended to apply before normal retirement age at all").
150. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 817-18; The Cash Balance Conundrum,supra
note 9, at 8 (statement of Joseph Perkins, former President of the American
Association of Retired Persons); Gregory C. Braden et al., Cash Balance Plan
Litigation,
Aug.
6,
1999,
at
http://www.abanet.org/tax/ppvtx/lexis/547199908048.doc (Apr. 4, 2004); Sheppard, supra note 76, at 171.
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contribution is larger than the investment component of the older
employee. 15 ' The older employee's argument, thus, is that this
discrepancy in rates of benefit accrual causes the CB plan to
violate ADEA's prohibition on age-based discrimination. Because
this method of calculating accrued benefits is typical of the
structure of CB plans, the import of the argument is that CB plans
inherently violate ADEA.152
Employers respond that the difference in benefit accrual is
dependent on the number of years between the date of the plan
contribution and the date of normal retirement. The younger
employees receive higher allocations of investment returns
because younger employers have more years between the date of
the contribution and the date of normal retirement than do older
employees. The amount of the investment return component may
be correlated with age, but age itself is not used in the calculation
of the investment return. 153 Current ADEA case law tends to
indicate that it is not an ADEA violation for employers to use
154
criteria in employment where those criteria correlate with age.
151. This example assumes that the terms of the CB plan provide for accrual
of the pay component and the investment component on it in the year that the
pay component is allocated to the account. If the plan does not treat the entire
investment component as an accrued benefit in that year, the plan will violate
ERISA's prohibition on back-loading. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 822-23
(refusing summary judgment on backloading question where plan varied
interest rates and benefit formula).
152. Engers v. AT&T Corp., No. 98-3660, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10937, at
*26-27 (D.N.J. June 29, 2000) (refusing to dismiss a claim alleging that
decreased accruals based on age violate ADEA and ERISA).
153. See Forman & Nixon, supra note 70, at 421-22 (discussing the
interpretation of the language "benefit accrual" in provisions prohibiting age
discrimination); Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 736-37 (citing permissible
correlations between age and benefit reductions).
154. The circuit courts are divided on the import of the Supreme Court's
opinion in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 609-11 (1993), for the
viability of disparate impact claims under ADEA.
Compare Mullin v.
Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 704 (1st Cir. 1999) (holding that "the ADEA does
not impose liability under a theory of disparate impact"); Salvato v. Ill. Dep't
of Human Rights, 155 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 1998) (holding that "in this
circuit, at least, the ADEA does not permit liability based solely on disparate
impact"); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996)
(holding that "plaintiffs cannot bring a disparate impact claim under the
ADEA") with Criley v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 119 F.3d 102, 105 (2d Cir. 1997)
(permitting a disparate impact claim only where the plaintiffs can show "a
disparate impact on the entire protected group, i.e., workers aged 40 and
over"); Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470 (8th Cir. 1996)
(concluding that disparate impact claims can be brought under the ADEA);
Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 856 (9th Cir. 2000) (permitting
an age discrimination claim to be brought under ADEA based on a disparate
impact theory).
Other circuits have expressed doubt about whether a
disparate impact claim may be brought under the ADEA but have not yet
directly confronted the issue. See DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48
F.3d 719, 734 (3d Cir. 1995); Rhodes v. Guiberson Oil Tools, 75 F.3d 989, 1004
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Employers, thus, have successfully argued that CB plans do not
violate ADEA simply because plan accruals negatively correlate
155
with age.
CB proponents also stress that the decision to sponsor a CB
plan typically can be defended as a reasonable business decision
made without discriminatory intent.
As discussed above,
employers offer a variety of rationales in support of their
conversion decisions. 156 To the extent that critics believe CB plans
tend to unfairly front-load benefits, plan sponsors can point to the
157
If
anti-backloading provisions imposed by ERISA and the IRC.
plan sponsors adopt plan terms in order to comply with the antibackloading rules it becomes difficult to argue that they selected
158
the plan terms for the purpose of discriminating based upon age.
Furthermore, those who advocate CB plans reason that the
plans differ little from DC plans. Since no one alleges that DC
plans inherently violate ADEA, the technical classification of CB
plans as DB plans should not affect their legality under ADEA.
After all, the typical DC plan also is made up of a pay component
and an investment component. Consider the expectations of two
employees who are similarly situated in all respects but for age.
Assume the employer makes equivalent pay contributions to the
accounts of both employees on January 15, 2000. If we then
project out the value of those pay contributions to normal
retirement age, including the investment component, the younger
employee will expect to have a higher account balance than the
older employee because the younger employee will have more
years of investment earnings on the pay contribution. This is legal
in a DC plan, and is effectively the same thing that occurs under
the typical CB plan. The potential legal difference is that, in order
to comply with technical DB plan statutory requirements, CB plan
accrued benefits are typically defined to include both the pay
component and the entire projected investment component on that
pay component. Because ADEA prohibits plans from decreasing
accrued benefits based upon the age of participants, CB plans may

(5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (DeMoss, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 F.3d 1042, 1048 (6th Cir. 1998);
Turlington v. Atlanta Gas Light Co., 135 F.3d 1428, 1436-37 n.17 (11th Cir.
1998).
155. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 826. See Engers, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10937, at *17-18 (dismissing a claim based solely on an alleged adverse impact
on older employees).
156. See supra Part I.B. 1 (discussing factors that entice employers to convert
to cash balance plans).
157. See infra note 184 and accompanying text.
158. ASSOCIATION OF PRIVATE PENSION & WELFARE PLANS, DETAILED
COMMENTS REGARDING CASH BALANCE PLANS 13-14 (2000), available at

http://americanbenefitscouncil.org/documents/dcrcbp00012o.pdf
Mar. 26, 2004).

(last visited
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violate the statute whereas DC plans do not. 159
Second, CB plan plaintiffs could argue that even if the plans
do not inherently violate the ADEA, the methodology used in
many plan conversions violates ADEA.160 The effect of many
conversions is to establish wear away periods for some employees.
As discussed above, 16' the result of the wearaways is that, for
some number of years, the benefits of the affected employees do
not increase. Since the affected employees tend to be the older
employees and older employees are more adversely affected by
wearaways than equally situated younger employees, those older
employees might argue that the conversion methodology violates
62
ADEA.1
Numerous employers avoid the wearaway question altogether
by grandfathering employees in the old plan or otherwise
protecting participants in the TDB plan from any negative effects
of conversion to a CB plan. 163 When conversions do result in
wearaways that have a disparate impact on older employees, the
employer again may argue that ADEA does not establish a cause
of action based on disparate impact. 164 As in the case of CB plan
structure, supporters of CB plans explain that the time it takes to
wearaway a vested benefit from the old TDB plan is based largely
on length of service and pay history. 165 Under this view, any
correlation with age is simply insufficient to state an ADEA
violation. 166 Finally, to the extent that the CB plan provides
positive options to participants that were not available under the
old TDB plan, such as the availability of lump sum cash-outs,
159. See Jonathan Barry Forman, Professor Responds to Cash-Balance
Pension PlanArticle, 1999 TAX NOTES TODAY 20-141 (Feb. 1, 1999) (discussing
the practical similarities between a traditional DC plan and a CB plan).
160. In an individual claim, an employee, claiming that he was chosen for
lay-off due to age discrimination, tried to use his employer's adoption of a CB
plan as age-based animus. The court rejected the claim because the terms of
the conversion guaranteed the employee the greater benefit under either the
old TDB plan or the new CB plan. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 985
F.2d 1113, 1120 (1st Cir. 1993). This was not a claim directly against the CB
plan or the conversion, and, thus, is of less importance for purposes of this
article.
161. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text (defining the concept of a
wearaway period and discussing its impact on employees).
162. The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 8 (statement of Joseph
Perkins, former President of the American Association of Retired Persons).
163. See supra notes 72-76 and accompanying text (discussing techniques
used by some companies to minimize the impact on employees when
converting to a CB plan).
164. See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text (stating that a negative
correlation between benefit accruals and age does not establish a violation of
the ADEA).
165. The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 92 (statement of John
F. Woyke, Actuary and Benefits Consultant, Principal, Towers Perrin).
166. Id.
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arguably the negative effect of any wearaways is offset by the
167
positive aspects of the new plan.
Between September 1999 and May 2000, more than 650 age
discrimination complaints based upon CB plans were filed with
168
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
However, after researching CB plan conversions and possible
violations of the ADEA, the EEOC decided against taking a
position on the issues.1 69 Reports indicate that the EEOC's
Chairwoman attributed the delay to "the complexity of the
issue."'170 It also appears that the EEOC is divided internally over
the issue of age discrimination in CB plans.' 71 Although the
agency received permission to file an amicus brief supporting the
plaintiffs in one plan conversion case, the commissioners allegedly
72
deadlocked over the agency's position and it did not file a brief.
The EEOC's Compliance Manual contains a section on employee
benefits. The guidance specifically states that the EEOC has not
reached any conclusion about the legality of cash balance plans
under AD EA. 173
2. IRC and ERISA Technical Challenges
As with ADEA, both the IRC and ERISA prohibit pension
plans from reducing accrued benefits based upon age. 1 74 CB plan
opponents rely on these provisions to make essentially the same
arguments
discussed
above
under
ADEA175-the
plans
discriminate based on age. 1 76 In Cooper v. IBM Personal Pension
167. See id. (discussing common benefits made available to employees when
companies convert to a CB plan).
168. Congel, supra note 64, at 1333; Vineeta Anand, Slow Going: EEOC
Delays Decisionon Cash Balance Fairness,PENS. & INv., May 29, 2000, at 1.
169. Congel, supra note 64, at 1333; Anand, supra note 168, at 1. According
to the relevant section of the EEOC Compliance Manual, "[t]he Commission is
currently studying the allegations in these charges, and,... has reached no
conclusion as to the lawfulness of cash balance plans."
THE EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION COMPLIANCE MANUAL ch. 3, § V(C) (Oct. 3, 2000), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/benefits.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2004).
170. Anand, supra note 168, at 1.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. EEOC, supra note 169, at ch. 3 § V(C).
174. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H) (2000); I.R.C. § 411(b)(1)(H)(i) (2000).
Typically, ERISA will preempt any state law claims, such as breach of contract
claims or claims brought under state anti-discrimination statutes. See Engers,
2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10937, at *3 n.1 (dismissing contract claims and claims
based upon New Jersey's anti-discrimination law as preempted by ERISA).
175. See supra Part II.A.1 (describing the legal challenges raised to support
the view that CB plans violate the ADEA).
176. Braden, supra note 150. See Engers, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10937, at
*26-27 (refusing to dismiss a claim alleging that decreased accruals based
upon age violate the ADEA and ERISA).
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Plan,177 IBM plan participants won a challenge brought under
ERISA section 204(b)(1)(H)(i),178 which prohibits plans from
reducing "the rate of an employee's benefit accrual ...because of
the attainment of any age."'1 79 The day after the Cooper decision,

the Seventh Circuit held in Berger v. Xerox Corp. Retirement
Income Guarantee Plan'80 that Xerox's CB plan violated ERISA
because of the methodology used to calculate lump sum
distributions.18 1
a. IBM and Accruals that Decrease Due to Employee's Age
ERISA requires accrued benefits to be determined based upon
the actuarial equivalent of the benefits at an employee's normal
retirement age. 182 To calculate the annual accrual for each
individual, a CB plan must determine the amount of a normal
retirement age annuity benefit that could be purchased with that
year's total annual plan contribution made by the employer on
behalf of the individual. Because older individuals are closer to
receiving annuity payments, it is more expensive to provide
annuities for them than for younger employees. 83 Furthermore,
the interest credits under the plan are part of accrued benefits and
are part of the annuity valuation.' 84 Therefore, for any two
employees similarly situated in terms of all relevant criteria
except for age, the same annual plan contribution will purchase a
smaller annuity for the older employee than for the younger
employee. Thus, the Cooper Court decided that the smaller
hypothetical annuities for older employees that result from this
artificial calculation necessarily mean that the CB plan violates
the IRC and ERISA.185

IBM argued that the pay component does not decrease based
on age, despite the fact that the annuity calculation does reveal
that older employees tend to earn lower rates of total accrued
benefits than equivalently situated younger employees. 186 The
disconnect between the pay component and age indicates that age
is simply correlated with the varying accrual rates; however
correlation alone is not sufficient to constitute a statutory
violation. 187 Instead, the effect simply flows from the time value of
177. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (S.D. Ill.
2003).

178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 1017.
29 U.S.C. § 1054(b)(1)(H)(i).
338 F.3d 755 (7th Cir. 2003).
Berger, 338 F.3d at 764.

182. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(23)(A) (2000); I.R.C. §§ 411(a)(7)(A)(i), 411(c)(3) (2000).
183. MCGILL & GRUBBS, supra note 35, at 531.
184. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1021.
185. Id. at 1021-22. See Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 733-43 (discussing
prohibition in age-based accrual reductions).
186. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1022.
187. The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 92 (statement of John
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money. 88 While the employees claim that the statutory language
is on their side in this debate, the employers counter that
regulation is on their side. A proposed Treasury regulation
explicitly states that "[a] defined benefit plan is not considered
to... reduce the rate of benefit accrual on behalf of a participant
because of the attainment of any age.., solely because of a
positive correlation between increased age and a reduction or
discontinuance in benefit accruals or account allocation under a
89
plan."1
Similarly, commentators observed that a former employee's
ongoing entitlement to the annual allocation of an investment
component provides a type of inflation protection. 190 Instead of
viewing those investment component allocations as effectively
decreasing late in life accruals, the commentators view the
allocations as positive factors to ensure that account balances are
not frozen for those employees who leave the plan prior to normal
retirement age. 19' Furthermore, rather than entitlement to an
investment component being tied to the age of the plan
participant, CB plans typically continue those allocations beyond
the death of a participant. 92 Allocations end only when a
beneficiary begins to receive plan benefits. 193
Thus, the
commentators conclude that if a reduction in benefit levels does
194
exist, it is not because of age.
Finally, the court rejected IBM's argument that the statutory
language does not define "benefit accrual rate," and it is
unreasonable to believe that the rate must always be calculated
based on a normal retirement age annuity. 195 If, instead, accruals
F. Woyke, Actuary and Benefits Consultant, Principal, Towers Perrin).
188. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1016.
189. 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(b)-2(a) (1988). Professor Zelinsky argues that the
proposed regulation is in conflict with the statute, and, thus, the plaintiffs'
statutory-based arguments should prevail. Furthermore, he observes that the
examples provided by the regulations are not directly on point to the usual
accrual patterns employed by CB plans. Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 736-37.
Professor Zelinsky determines that CB plans violate the prohibition on agebased reductions in accruals because the cost of annuities is determined
purely on the basis of the age of the participant. Id. at 742-43. However,
annuity costs are dependent on factors other than age, such as whether the
annuity covers more than one life, or whether it provides for a minimum
number of payments. MCGILL & GRUBBS, supra note 35, at 137-42. Thus,
depending upon the terms of the chosen annuities, two individuals of the same
age would face different annuity costs. Whether CB plans meet the statutory
requirement on this basis is both unclear and beyond the scope of this article.
190. Shea, supra note 149, at 774-75.
191. Id. at 776-77.
192. Id. at 777.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Cooper, 274 F. Supp. 2d at 1016-17, 1022. See Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d
at 818-20 (discussing calculating accrual rates); Shea, supra note 149, at 766-
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were measured by the annual increase of the current CB in the
participant's account, most CB plans would comply with this
requirement. 196 Alternatively, compliance could be evaluated by
looking to the language of the plan, or to the value of immediate
197
annuities at current age.
In December 2002, the Treasury Department and the IRS
published proposed regulations that concluded that some standard
CB plan paradigms are not age discriminatory for purposes of
ERISA and the IRS. 198 The proposed regulations did substantially
limit the approaches that may be used by an employer
implementing a CB plan. 199 Due to the extensive comments
submitted on the proposed regulations, the IRS has not yet issued
final regulations. 200 In the meantime, the IRS continues to refuse
20
to issue determination letters on new or converted CB plans. '
b.

Xerox and Lump Sum Calculations

The Xerox case involved arguments predicated on another
esoteric-sounding basis. The basic allegation in that case was that
CB plans "whipsaw" participants by using different interest rates
for different purposes 202 or by otherwise calculating lump sum
benefits in ways that minimize those benefits. The calculation
methodology used by the Xerox plan provides a good example of
the controversy.
A participant who left employment prior to normal retirement
age (NRA) had two choices: (1) wait and receive a benefit at NRA
or (2) take an immediate lump sum from the plan.20 3 A participant
who waited until NRA to receive the benefit would properly
receive all the interest credits provided for by the plan at the rate
of the one-year Treasury rate plus one percent, including credits
between date of separation and NRA.204 In contrast, a participant
who elected an immediate lump sum would receive interest credits
after termination only at the same interest rate used to discount
the result to a present value-an interest rate that by statute is
established by the PBGC.205 The net result is that a participant's
immediate lump sum entitlement would be less than if the interest
crediting is done using the plan rate so long as the PBGC rate was

72 (discussing why Professor Zelinsky's proposals misinterpret the law).
196. Eaton, 117 F. Supp. 2d at 820.
197. Shea, supra note 149, at 772-74.
198. 67 Fed. Reg. 76123-01, 76124 (Dec. 11, 2002).
199. Id. at 76123-24.
200. The Cash Balance Plan Hearings:A Recap, supra note 4, at 9.
201. Id.
202. Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 723-24, 748-53.
203. Berger, 338 F.3d at 758-59.
204. Id. at 759.
205. Id. at 760.
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6
lower than the estimated plan rate. 20
Not only did the district court determine that this violated
ERISA, it awarded the plaintiff class $300 million as the amount
Xerox underpaid in lump sums. 20 7 The Seventh Circuit affirmed
except with respect to some relatively minor adjustments to the
calculation of damages. 208 The key to the Seventh Circuit court's
rationale is its determination that, as the district court decided in
Cooper,20 9 accrued benefits in a CB plan include future interest
210
credits calculated at the normal rate specified by the plan.

c.

Fiduciary Obligations.

CB plans also have been challenged for violating ERISA's
fiduciary requirements. 211 ERISA requires benefit plan fiduciaries
to act "solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries
and... for the exclusive purpose of... providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries. '21 2 Employers that sponsor
plans are plan fiduciaries to the extent that they exercise
discretion over the operation of their plans. 21 3 Plaintiffs argue
that when an employer converts its TDB plan to a CB plan in
order to reduce its plan costs or to realize some. other benefit for
itself and its shareholders that the employer violates its fiduciary
obligation by not making its decision "with an eye single to the
21 4
interests of the participants and beneficiaries."
However, the Supreme Court has drawn a distinction
between discretionary actions involving plan management and an
employer=s decision-making in establishing and amending plan
terms.215 In a trilogy of recent cases, the Court confirmed that
206. Id. at 760-61.
207. Id. at 757.
208. Id. at 764.
209. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
210. Berger, 338 F.3d at 762.
211. Corcoran v. Bell Atlantic Corp., No. 97-510, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14662, at *28-31 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 23, 1997) (dismissing plaintiffs' fiduciary
claim on the basis of the settlor doctrine), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1350 (3d Cir. 1998).
The complexity of converting a TDB plan to a CB plan also may lead to
documentation issues that give rise to claims alleging breach of fiduciary duty.
See Engers, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 10937, at *18-21 (refusing to dismiss claims
that fiduciaries failed to document plan terms in a timely manner).
212. 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2000). See Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein,
ERISA's Fundamental Contradiction:The Exclusive Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1105, 1108 (1988) (noting that "ERISA's exclusive benefit rule...
imports into pension fiduciary law one of the most fundamental and
distinctive principles of trust law, the duty of loyalty").
213. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A). See generally Dana M. Muir, FiduciaryStatus
as an Employer's Shield: The Perversity of ERISA Fiduciary Law, 2 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMPL. L. 391 (2000) (discussing ways in which employers rely on
ERISA's fiduciary provisions as a shield against liability).
214. Donovan v. Bierwirth, 680 F.2d 263, 271 (2d Cir. 1982).
215. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 443 (1999); Lockheed
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employers do not act as fiduciaries when they adopt, amend or
terminate their employee benefit plans. 216 This "settlor doctrine,"
is founded on the rationale that, when adopting, amending or
terminating plans, an employer plays a role analogous to that of
the settlor of a testamentary trust. 217 In the CB plan context, the
settlor doctrine means that an employer does not breach its ERISA
fiduciary obligations by establishing CB terms that are favorable
2 18
to itself.
B. Ethical Challenges
In addition to the legal challenges, critics of CB plans allege
that plan conversions impinge upon employees' reasonably
established expectations and, thus, unfairly negate the implicit
contract made between the employees and the employer just as the
time has come for the employer to pay its share of that bargain. 21 9
Conversions from TDB to CB plans often negatively affect older,
long-term workers either by establishing wearaways that provide
lower benefit accruals in the final years of employment or by
eliminating early retirement benefits. 220 In cases, employees'
complaints ring with notions of unfairness and dashed
expectations.
One twenty-eight year employee testified to
Congress that he lost "approximately 30% of the value of [his]
pension, which translate[d] into a lump-sum dollar loss well in
excess of $400,000"221 in a plan conversion. In the words of other
employees: "I am a 25 year Bell Atlantic employee who has had his
pension cut about 30%,"222 "[m]y best estimate is that the change
will cost me about $7500/year when I retire,"223 and "It]he end
result is that I have lost 41-42% of my age-65 annual pension
benefit."224
Corp. v. Spink, 517 U.S. 882, 890-91 (1996); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 78 (1995). For an extensive discussion of these
cases, see Dana M. Muir, The Plan Amendment Trilogy: Settling the Scope of
the Settlor Doctrine, 15 THE LAB. LAW. 205 (1999).
216. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443; Spink, 517 U.S. at 890-91; Curtiss-Wright, 514
U.S. at 78.
217. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 443.
218. Corcoran, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14662, at *28-31.
219. The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 30 (statement of Karen
Ferguson, Director of The Pension Rights Center).
220. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text (discussing plan changes
that decrease benefits for older workers).
221. The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 3 (statement of James
A. Bruggeman, Employee of Central and South West Corporation).
222. Archived
GuestBook
(June-Oct.
17,
1999),
at
http://www.cashpensions.com/
welcome.html#guestbk (last visited Feb. 25, 2004) [hereinafter Archived
GuestBook] (comment of Gregg Heinold on Oct. 15, 1999).
223. Id. (comment of Larry Franks on Oct. 8, 1999).
224. Id. (comment of John Staudt on Sept. 28, 1999).
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Employees argue that under the deferred wage theory of
pension plans, they work in exchange for their total compensation
package-cash compensation, health care benefits, future pension
benefits, and so forth. 225 That theoretical view of pension earnings
in a TDB plan suggests that employees work for low levels of
pension accruals during their early years of employment in
exchange for higher rates of accruals in their final years. 226 In
effect, they are under compensated in the early years of the
employment relationship and over compensated in the later years.
Applying that theoretical perspective on pension plans, the
employees' comments quoted above reflect their view that the
employer breached the parties' implicit deferred wage contract.
The employers reaped the benefit of low rates of compensation in
the early years and now refuse to pay the higher rates expected by
the employees in the final years of employment.
However, the debate is not occurring solely on a theoretical
level, and employee complaints also reflect employees' bitterness
and sense of unfair treatment. A few consultants and actuaries
have fed employee frustration by making widely publicized
comments that acknowledge some of the more problematic results
that can be associated with CB plans. For example, an attorney
testifying at a Senate Pension Hearing testified that one actuary
informed his colleagues "it is easy to install a CB plan in place of a
TDB plan and cover up cutbacks in future benefit accruals." 227
Another expert explained that "what I have found is that while the
employees understand [CB plan benefits], it is not until they are
actually ready to retire that they understand how little they are
228
actually getting."
Employers respond to charges of unfairness and breach of the
implicit employment bargain by pointing to their legal right to
modify the benefit plans they sponsor. 229 Invariably, the employer
has reserved its right to amend or terminate its TDB plan. 230
Absent unusual circumstances, such disclaimers effectively negate
any allegations that parties had entered into an enforceable
contract preventing the modification of plan terms during the term

225. See Lorraine A. Schmall, Keeping Employer Promises When Relational
Incentives No Longer Pertain: "Right Sizing" and Employee Benefits, 68 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 276, 286 (2000) (noting that pensions are an integral part of
American compensational systems).
226. Id. at 287-88.
227. Hearingon Pension Issues Before the Senate Comm. On Finance, 106th
Cong. (1999) (statement of Robert F. Hill, Esq., trial attorney, Denver, Co.).

228. Id.
229. Curtiss-Wright, 514 U.S. at 76-77 (exemplifying an employer's legal
right to modify).

230. Id. at 76 (referring to the Curtiss-Wright plan's amendment language
as the "standard reservation clause"); CANAN, supra note 32, at §§ 13.1-13.3.
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of employment. 231 Similarly, the settlor doctrine, which is now
well established by the Supreme Court, protects employers from
breach of fiduciary duty claims.232 In effect, employers rely on
their legal rights to challenge the legitimacy of the employees'
pension expectations.
The employers' legal right to amend their benefit plans also
supports the argument that the deferred wage theory only
legitimizes those employee expectations that incorporate "both the
reality of existing pension coverage and the risk that such
coverage might change in the future." 233
Furthermore, an
employer can end its obligations associated with its DB plan by
replacing the DB plan with a DC plan or not providing a pension
plan at all. For the participants, a CB plan is likely to be
234
preferable to either of these alternatives.
A second, related argument on the fairness of CB plan
conversions is that a conversion permits a plan sponsor to achieve
much the same effect as if the sponsor terminated the TDB plan
and replaced it with a DC plan. However, unlike the TDB to DC
sequence, a TDB to CB conversion technically is not a plan
termination. The conversion need not meet any of the extensive
rules for plan termination 235 and does not give rise to any of the
236
tax liabilities.
As seen above, the terminations of the 1980's engendered so
much controversy that Congress discouraged terminations by
imposing hefty tax penalties for terminations of overfunded TDB
238
plans.237 Those taxes have been effective in achieving that goal.
Subsequently, employers adopted the technique of using a CB plan
conversion instead of a plan termination.
For example, by
converting its plan, an employer can transform its plan into one
that changes the pattern of benefit accruals from that of a TDB
plan to a smooth pattern that mirrors those provided by a DC
plan.
The employer also can report lump-sum benefits to
231. Sprague v. Gen. Motors Corp., 133 F.3d 388, 399-400 (6th Cir. 1998).
232. See supra notes 215-218 and accompanying text (discussing the settlor
doctrine).
233. Zelinsky, supra note 30, at 756.
234. A terminating DB plan will be assessed substantial tax obligations,
thereby reducing the amount of plan assets available for participant benefits.
See supra notes 132-135 and accompanying text (discussing Congressional
taxation of DB plan terminations). Many believe CB plans to be superior to
DC plans because in CB plans, the investment risk tends to reside on the
employer, participants enjoy PBGC insurance protection, and so forth. See
supra notes and accompanying text 50-55 (discussing the attractiveness of CB

plans).
235. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 446-47.
236. I.R.C. § 4980 (2000).
237. See supra Part I.C (discussing plan reversions during the 1980s).
238. See supra notes and accompanying text 132-136 (discussing
Congressional taxation).
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employees and provide for lump-sum benefit payouts both of
which are more usual in DC plans than in TDB plans. Thus,
critics allege that the plan conversions are a technical way of
avoiding the penalties against the termination of overfunded TDB
239
plans, while still.achieving similar results.
Again, the response by those who support CB conversions
tends to rely on the legality of the conversions. In a non-CB plan
context, the Supreme Court rejected an argument that extensive
amendments made by Hughes Aircraft to its pension plan were the
functional equivalent of a plan termination and should be
regulated as such. 240 Given the Supreme Court's continuing
emphasis on formalism in ERISA analysis, employers have
substantial authority for their position that the courts should not
treat conversions of TDB plans to CB plans as the functional
equivalent of TDB plan terminations. 241 Nonetheless, while this
argument responds to the objections at a legal level, it sidesteps
the underlying allegations of unfairness and improper use of a
complex maneuver to avoid substantial excess taxes.

III. RATIONALES FOR INCREASED DISCLOSURE
Approaches to the increased regulation of conversions from
TDB plans to CB plans may be grouped into two categories. First,
substantive regulation could be imposed on the conversions. For
example, employees might be guaranteed the right to continue to
accrue benefits under the same terms as provided by the original
plan. 242
Or, plans might be prohibited from imposing
wearaways. 243 The second possible approach to regulation is one
that concentrates on increasing the disclosure associated with
conversions as opposed to substantively regulating the terms of
239. Advisory Council Report, supra note 10 (testimony of Professor Norman
Stein).
240. Hughes, 525 U.S. at 446-47.
241. Advisory Council Report, supra note 10 (testimony of Professor Norman
Stein).
242. Older Workers Pension Protection Act of 1999, H.R. 2759/S. 1600, 106th
Cong. § 2 (1999); Pension Benefits Protection and Preservation Act of 1999,
H.R.2902/S. 1640, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999). See The Cash Balance Conundrum,
supra note 9, at 8 (statement of Karen Ferguson, Director of The Pension
Rights Center) (arguing substantive regulation on CB conversions should
include three components: (1) employee option to be grand fathered in original
plan, (2) protection of employees' reasonable expectations, and (3) taxation of
conversions that fail to comply with item (1) or (2)); id. at 9 (statement of

Joseph Perkins, former President of the America Association of Retired
Persons) (proposing that (1) employees have choice of plans or be
grandfathered in original plan, and (2) plans be prohibited from "freezing"
benefit accruals for older employees).
243. See Pension Benefits Protection and Preservation Act of 1999, H.R.

2902/S. 1640, 106th Cong. § 3 (1999); Older Workers Pension Protection Act of
1999, H.R. 2759/S. 1600, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999).
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plan conversions. Increased disclosure is-the approach that was
enacted as part of the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 (EGTRRA),244 thus, this Article focuses
on it.
Prior to EGTRRA's passage, legislative proposals to mandate
increased disclosure about plan conversions spanned a broad
spectrum in their approach to the issue. 245 At one end of that
spectrum, Representative Robert J. Portman's Comprehensive
Retirement Security and Pension Reform Act would have required
that participants receive notice of any applicable plan changes at
least thirty days prior to their effective date. 246 Prior law required
247
notice to be given at least fifteen days prior to the effective date.
Representative Portman's proposal, requiring notice to explain the
reduction in plan benefits had no provision for providing any
individualized participant information. 248 At the other end of the
spectrum, bills proposed by Representative Gerald C. Weller and
Senator Daniel P. Moynihan would have required any plan that is
reducing future benefit accruals 249 to provide individual plan
participants with specific comparisons of their benefits under the
original plan and under the proposed plans. 250 Those comparisons
would have been required to have been made on both a current
and a projected basis. 251 In the middle was a proposal that would
have required plans to provide participants with illustrative
examples of the effect of proposed plan amendments. 252 In
addition, any participant who requested it would have been
entitled to sufficient information about the assumptions used in
the examples to enable the participant to calculate the effect of the
253
proposed amendment on his own benefit.

244. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, 115 Stat. 70 (2001).
245. The bills were similar in that all three of the major bills would have
applied to any plan change that involved a "significant reduction in the rate of
future benefit accrual." The Comprehensive Retirement Security and Pension
Reform Act of 1999, H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 407 (1999). See Pension Right to
Know Act, H.R. 1176/S. 659, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (applying to "large defined
benefit plan[s]" that are amended with the "effect of significantly reducing the
rate of future benefit accrual"); Pension Reduction Disclosure Act, H.R.
3047/S. 1708, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999) (applying to amendments "provid[ing] for
a significant reduction in the rate of future benefit accrual").
246. The Comprehensive Retirement Security and Pension Reform Act of
1999, H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 407 (1999).
247. 29 U.S.C. § 1054 (2000).
248. The Comprehensive Retirement Security and Pension Reform Act of
1999, H.R. 1102, 106th Cong. § 407 (1999).
249. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (discussing how CB plans
tend to reduce plan accruals).
250. Pension Right to Know Act, H.R. 1176/S. 659, 106th Cong. § 2 (1999).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
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The compromise adopted in EGTRRA requires plans to give
written notice to plan participants about any plan amendment
that would significantly reduce the rate of future benefit
Thus, the provision is not limited to CB plan
accruals. 254
conversions. In fact, it would not even apply to conversions that do
not result in a reduction of future benefit accruals. Substantively
the legislation simply requires that the notice disclose sufficient
that the participants can understand the
information
The notice must be given "within a
amendment's effect.
255
reasonable time" before the amendment becomes effective.
Three possible rationales explain the adoption of increased
disclosure requirements for TDB plans that convert to CB plans.
In the discussion that follows, this Article describes these
rationales based upon the effect the increased disclosure would be
expected to have on decision-making. This article categorizes
those possibilities as having: (1) a group effect; (2) an individual
effect; or (3) a relational effect.
If all plans provided the information at issue in the absence of
legislation, there would be no reason for legislative change. At
least in some instances, then, enhanced disclosure requirements
can be expected to result in more information being provided to
individuals affected by the plan changes than those individuals
would have had in lieu of the regulatory requirement. This is true
whether the increased information simply provides earlier notice
of plan changes, or whether it supplies participant-specific benefit
comparisons under the original and amended plans.
Simply understanding that more extensive disclosure
requirements will result in affected parties having more
information does not alone describe the effect that disclosure will
have on decision-making. Considering the potential effects more
specifically, one possibility is that the increased information will
enable employees to better understand how they will be affected
by the plan amendment. As a result, employees may mobilize and
take collective action to defeat or modify the plan conversion. In
this scenario, the result of increased information is that the
employees convince their employer to change its course of action
Similarly, the existence of the
vis-a-vis the pension plan.
enhanced disclosure requirements might affect the decision of an
employer contemplating a conversion to a CB plan. The employer
knows it must provide advance disclosure about a plan change
that would have an adverse effect on at least some employees, thus
the employer may decide to avoid the negative employee response
it would expect from the change. The result would then be that
the employer would not convert its plan or would undertake a

254. EGTRRA, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 659, 115 Stat. 70 (2001).
255. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(h)(3) (2000).
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conversion that is more favorable to the employees than it
otherwise would have been. Whether the effect of increased
information occurs because of explicit employee action or implicit
pressure on employers, these outcomes are similar in that the
imposition of disclosure requirements affects the rate or terms of
plan conversions. In any given plan, all similarly situated plan
participants are affected to an equal degree; therefore, this Article
refers to this as the "group effect" of increased disclosure
requirements.
Second, increased disclosure could have an "individual effect"
on decision-making. Assume increased disclosure does not give
rise to a group effect. 256 The result would be that, even though the
plan must comply with enhanced disclosure requirements, the
increased information would not have any effect on plan-level
decision-making. The plan would be converted from a TDB to a
CB plan under the same terms as would have occurred in the
absence of the enhanced disclosure. However, the increased
availability of information may enable some plan participants to
understand that their employer-sponsored plan benefit will be less
under the CB plan than it would have been under the TDB plan.
On an individual basis, some plan participants may respond by
acting differently outside of the plan than they otherwise would
have. For example, an employee may decide to change jobs and
accept a position with an employer that offers a more lucrative
pension plan than the converted CB plan. Or, an employee might
increase personal retirement savings outside the employersponsored pension plan to offset the loss of expected plan benefits.
Or, an employee might take a second job that provides additional
pension benefits. Finally, an employee might decide to work
longer than he planned at the original employer in order to receive
the same benefit he expected under the original plan.
Third, it is possible that, at least for some employees,
increased information will not result in either a group effect or an
individual effect. Again, begin with the assumption that enhanced
disclosure does not give rise to a group effect. It also is reasonable
to assume that while increased information might cause some
individuals to change their behavior, others will not. Because of
personal wealth, family factors, or even simple lethargy, even if a
conversion to a CB plan reduces their benefit entitlement, some
individuals are likely to remain at the employer, save as little or
as much as before, and retire on the same date they expected to
retire before the conversion.
In the case of those individuals, the only effect of increased
disclosure might be termed a "relational effect." That relational

256. See infra Part IV (discussing why enhanced disclosure might not give
rise to a group effect).
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effect is difficult to predict because individual employees may react
differently to the information about the plan conversion. The
enhanced information might positively affect the employee's
attitude toward the employer because the employee is grateful
that the employer has been open and honest about the plan
change. 257 Or, the enhanced information might negatively affect
the employee's attitude toward the employer because he
understands how much he loses under the plan change, even
258
though the loss does not affect his observable decision-making.
IV. A VOTING

MODEL FOR ENHANCED DISCLOSURE

For purposes of this section, this Article assumes that the
primary goal of enhanced disclosure requirements is to have a
group effect on CB plan conversions. 259 Opponents of conversions
tend to decry the use of conversions or, at a minimum, the use of
wearaways. Similarly, as discussed above, the ethical arguments
against CB plans are founded in the unfairness implicit in
the implicit contract between employer and
defeating
employees. 260 Providing participants with additional information
solely for the purpose of enabling them to take actions such as
increasing their personal savings rates would not address this
implicit contract concern.
In order to predict whether increased disclosure would be
expected to achieve the group effect that seems to be its goal, this
257. See Communicating Cash Balance Plans,WATSON WYATT INSIDER, Apr.
at
2000,
3
http://www.watsonwyatt.com/us/pubs/insider/showarticle.asp?ArticlelD=9 14
&Component=The+Insider (last visited Mar. 26, 2004) (discussing the
relational gains of a good communications package).
258. There also may be a public relational effect between legislators and
their constituents. For a cynical viewpoint, by imposing higher levels of
disclosure requirements, legislators may satisfy constituents who demand a
response to CB plan conversions. From the perspective of those constituents,
the legislators will have taken action. The legislators, thus, derive increased
political support from that interest group. However, because the disclosure
requirements are ineffective in bringing about change at either the group or
individual level, the interest group has not, in fact, improved its position. At
the same time, because employers are able to go forward with CB plan
conversions, after incurring the costs of increased disclosure, legislators
experience no loss of political support from the employer side. See Dana M.
Muir, From YUPPIES to GUPPIES, Unfunded Mandates and Benefit Plan
Regulation, 34 GA. L. REv. 195, 268 (1999) (discussing a similar theory in the
context of other benefit legislation).
259. The extent to which people appear to perceive CB plan conversions as
being unfair supports this assumption. After all, providing participants with
additional information solely for the purpose of enabling them to take actions
such as increasing their personal savings rates would not affect any
negotiations on the implicit contract between employers and employees.
260. See supra Part II.B (discussing the ethical challenges to cash balance
plans).
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Article develops and then applies a voting model.
First, it
identifies the stakeholders that would be expected to have an
interest and a voice in the determination and adoption of a CB
plan conversion. For each stakeholder group, it analyzes the
group's expected position vis-A-vis a CB plan conversion. Although
the stakeholders typically will not have a formal vote on the
conversion of a TDB plan to a DC plan, 261 it is not unreasonable to
expect the stakeholders to seek some input into such a decision. In
fact, if they are expected to be disinterested in that decision, that
too is a type of input. Here, the voting model is used as a proxy for
stakeholder input. The section ends by discussing the expected
results given the predicted voting patterns of the stakeholders.
A. Stakeholder Groups and Their Positions
on Cash Balance Plan Conversions
The most obvious effects of CB plan conversions incide upon
employees. However, different employee demographic groups will
be affected by a conversion in varying ways. To further complicate
matters, the model anticipates that other stakeholders, in addition
to employees, would be affected by the conversion of a TDB plan to
a CB plan. As a result, the model also considers the expected
voting patterns of shareholders, suppliers, management, and
community members.
Because the specific terms of any given plan conversion may
significantly affect the experience of stakeholders, this model
makes a number of assumptions in order to standardize the
analysis. 262 First, it assumes that the TDB plan, which is being
converted, and the CB plan, which is replacing it, have equivalent
costs. 263 Second, it assumes that a cohort of older, long service
employees, referred to as the "older employee cohort," would
experience a significant reduction in their normal retirement age
benefits due to the plan conversion. 264 Third, it assumes that a

261. Of course, in some situations, some stakeholders do receive the right to
formally vote on a plan conversion. One example is the IBM shareholder
proposal, which entitled all equity holders to vote on the IBM plan conversion.
2000 IBM PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 22-23.
262. Although the assumptions have the effect of simplifying on actual
experience, the model still provides a basis to begin the discussion on the
expected effects of increasing disclosure requirements for plan conversions.
263. This permits the model to control for the "richness" of the plan. In
addition, some number of plan conversions do appear to be approximately cost
neutral. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text (discussing a study
regarding a shift in plan designs).
264. To the extent that employers fully protect their current employees from
any negative effects of a plan conversion, the objections to conversions appear
to decrease significantly. See Stein, supra note 73, at 32 (discussing Kodak as
an example of an employer that protected its employees against the negative
effects of a CB plan).
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cohort of younger employees and potential employees, referred to
as the "younger employee cohort," would realize larger retirement
benefit accruals, at least in the first ten years of their employment
than they would have under the traditional plan, and would
experience little or no reduction in their normal age retirement
benefit. 265 Finally, the voting model assumes that the disclosure
regime would result in full and accurate information being
available to all stakeholder groups.
1.

Older Employee Cohort

Given the foregoing assumptions, the conversion of a TDB
plan to a CB plan causes the older employee cohort to experience a
This group,
reduction in normal retirement age benefits.
therefore, would be expected to vote against such a plan
conversion. In the past, the opposition of the older employee
After all, by
cohort may have carried significant weight.
definition, the employer converting its plan is one that voluntarily
adopted a TDB plan at an earlier time. It is widely accepted that
some of the reasons that led employers to adopt TDB plans was
that those plans helped to decrease turnover and increase
employee retention. 266 Long service employees were valued for
their experience and loyalty to the company. This value also was
reflected in the positive correlation that tends to exist between
compensation and length of service.
However, current workforce dynamics may reduce the voting
power of the older employee cohort. To the extent that employers
need to make a choice in allocating overall compensation and
benefit costs between older and younger workers, a variety of
factors may tend to militate in favor of the younger employee
cohort. To the extent, then, that the interests of the younger
employee cohort diverge from the older employee cohort,
employers now may give more priority to the votes of the younger
group. Furthermore, employers may believe that older employees
now are relatively locked into their jobs. Anecdotal evidence
indicates that during both booming and lean economic periods,
experienced, older workers find it difficult to change jobs.267
265. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text (discussing the accrual
pattern of younger workers under a CB plan). The positive effect of the CB
plan is enhanced for workers who leave after vesting in their benefits but
before spending a full career at an employer. See Brown, supra note 50, at 1825 (developing an analytical model of employee support for plan conversions
There also may be a group of
predicated on employee turnover rates).
employees whose benefit entitlement would be minimally affected by the plan
conversion. This Article assumes those employees are neutral regarding the
adoption of the plan.
266. Scott, supra note 78, at 920.
267. Joseph Pereira, Out of Options: A Worker's Quest for a Job Lands on a
Street Corner, WALL ST. J., Mar. 5, 2003, at Al; Robert Tomsho, Left Out:
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Commitment to community, an existing benefit earned under the
employer's retirement plan, other benefit programs, skills that are
in relatively small demand in the marketplace, or even lethargy
may cause the older employee cohort to be less mobile than the
younger employee cohort.
A rational employer might, thus,
discount the vote of the older employee cohort as being irrelevant
or at least minimal in its likely effect on the employees' expected
job tenure and performance.
2.

Younger Employee Cohort

The conversion to a CB plan enables young workers to earn
In
benefits more quickly than they otherwise would have.
addition, the standard ability to choose a lump sum distribution
when an individual changes jobs means that CB plan benefits are
more portable than TDB plan benefits. Under the terms of
traditional plans, former employees typically had to wait until
retirement age to receive any benefit from the plan. Given these
incentives, the younger worker cohort would be expected to
enthusiastically support the conversion of a TDB plan to a CB
plan. Their expected support would be particularly strong if they
expected to spend less than their entire career at the employer.
In the past, the younger employee cohort may have taken a
broader perspective on the effect of plan changes on older
employees. Two factors would have militated in favor of the
younger employee cohort deferring, at least in part, to the
interests of the older employee cohort. First, because the goal of
the younger employee cohort may have been to spend an entire
career with an employer, they would have looked at the very longterm effects of a plan conversion. According to the assumptions of
the voting model, the conversion would not have significantly
affected the benefits of members of the younger employee cohort
who would stay at the employer for their entire career. Given the
lack of any discernable long-term difference to themselves, and a
substantially harmful effect on their fellow workers in the older
employee cohort, the younger group might vote against the
conversion. However, if it is true, 268 that the younger employee
cohort no longer expects or seeks career employment, then those
workers may tend to vote more in their short-term best interestmeaning they would vote in favor of the conversion.
Second, in the past reputation concerns may have affected
voting patterns. At least in theory, the younger employee cohort
may have considered the employer=s negative treatment of older
Joblessness is Low, So It's All the Harder Being Without a Job, WALL ST. J.,
July 25, 2000, at Al (detailing the unemployment of Robert Mabry, age fortynine).
268. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text (discussing why CB plans
are more efficient than TDB plans).
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employees, and been concerned whether they too would suffer
some type of negative economic consequences once they aged and
became less valuable to the employer.
Even if the younger
employee cohort expected to personally benefit under the
converted pension plan, the notion that the employer is willing to
impose negative consequences on the older employee cohort might
have given pause to the younger group. However, increased job
mobility and decreased long-term employment expectations also
would serve to undercut the younger employee cohort's concern
with the reputation effect of a CB plan conversion.
In sum, given demographic and job changes, it is logical that
bargaining power in the workplace has shifted to some extent from
older to younger workers. Furthermore, the younger employee
cohort may no longer engage in decision-making based upon a
model of lifetime employment, if it ever did. Assuming that the
younger workers vote in their short-term interest, they will vote
for the benefit plan that provides them with the highest accrual
rates in the near short term and offers the most portable benefits.
That means that they will vote in favor of conversion from a TDB
plan to a CB plan.
3. Shareholder
The voting model expects that non-employee equity
shareholders will vote according to the perceived efficiencies of a
potential plan conversion. In evaluating the efficiencies from the
viewpoint of shareholders, a number of factors must be considered.
First, shareholders would be expected to support pension plan
terms that most efficiently address the retirement savings needs of
the employer=s workforce needs. As noted above, as a general
matter employers believe that the younger employee cohort
understands CB benefits better, and values them more highly
than equivalent benefits from a TDB plan.269 Second, the fastest
growing job categories between 1998 and 2008 are all predicted to
be information technology positions. Workers for those positions
will tend to be younger, and may have shorter expected job tenures
than do older workers. For the same reasons just discussed under
the younger worker cohort, those workers will prefer CB plans to
TDB plans. Thus, workforce considerations would be expected to
lead shareholders to vote in favor of conversions to CB plans.
The ways in which pension plans are funded also may lead
shareholders to vote in favor of conversion to a CB plan. An
employer's obligation to fund a CB plan is more predictable than
the funding obligations of a TDB plan. Historically, sponsors of
TDB plans accepted all the investment risk associated with
funding a plan where liabilities were heavily dependent upon
269. See supra Part I.B. 1 (discussing motivations for plan conversions).
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variables such as salary levels, turnover, and 'longevity. If the
investment returns were less than projected, the employer was
responsible for increasing its contribution to offset the under
funding. In comparison, CB plans specify a promised investment
rate of return. The employer=s liability for investment returns
that are lower than expected is limited to the promised rate of
return. 270 The sponsor of a CB plan, in this way, has more control
over the effect of investment risk on its funding obligation than
does the sponsor of a TDB plan. Shareholders may prefer the
predictability associated with CB plan funding obligations.
For a firm with a substantial number of older employees, the
accrual obligations of a TDB also could be an important factor to
shareholders. Most conversions to CB plans are conversions of
overfunded TDB plans. 271 Employers with an overfunded plan and
a significant number of older workers approaching retirement age
face two types of financial concerns. First, the increased benefit
accruals of the older employees could consume the plan surplus.
The employer then would be required to resume contributions to
the plan. The renewal of contribution obligations obviously would
affect the financial obligations of the firm.
Second, even if
increased accruals do not consume the entire pension plan surplus,
they will cause the surplus to be lower than it would have been in
the absence of the increased accruals.
Current accounting
methods permit employers to report pension plan gains as
operating income and, before the recent declines in the equity
markets and interest rates, that ability significantly enhanced the
returns of numerous public companies. 272 For example, in 1999
273
IBM's financial results included $638 million in pension income.
If surpluses are decreased, those returns also will be reduced.
Both the potential for renewed contribution obligations and for
lower reportable plan gains are reasons for shareholders to vote in
favor of the conversion of an overfunded plan to a CB plan.
Although the theoretical analysis indicates that shareholders
would be expected to support plan conversion, some anecdotal
evidence also exists on this question. Arguably, one would not
expect to see significant numbers of companies converting plans if
the shareholders perceived the conversions to be against their
interests. Thus, the significant rate of conversions that occurred,
270. The sponsor of a CB plan can further limit its risk by defining the rate
of return in terms of a floating index or other method that reflects changing
market conditions. See supra note 55 and accompanying text (discussing
possible rates for the investment component). See also Forman & Nixon,
supra note 70, at 408-09 (discussing an employer's ability to benefit by the
spread between actual and promised rates of return in a CB plan).
271. See supra note 89 and accompanying text (discussing how CB plans are

established).
272. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing pension plans).
273. Anand, Full Disclosure, supra note 25, at 1.
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particularly among large public companies, 274 provides support for
the theoretical results.
As a more specific anecdotal example, though, we can ask
whether the IBM situation calls the theoretical analysis into
question. While the controversy over IBM's conversion to a CB
was ongoing, IBM's proxy statement for 2000 included a
shareholder resolution opposing implementation of the CB plan.
The resolution was sponsored by 344 employees who owned IBM
shares, 275 and garnered 28.2% of the shares voted at the annual
meeting. 276 Data indicates that, on average, shareholder proposals
dealing with social policy issues typically attract a very low level of
shareholder support. 277 One might ask then why the proposal
against adoption of a CB plan at IBM gained acceptance with a
greater percentage of the voting shareholders than does the
normal social policy proxy proposal. One explanation consistent
with the theoretical analysis is that significant support probably
came from members of the older employee cohort who held IBM
stock. However, this does not explain the voting in its entirety.
Some large institutional shareholders such as the California
Public Employee Retirement System (CALPERS) supported the
proposal. 278
Similarly, Institute for Shareholder Services, a
private service company that provides advice to institutional
investors on issues such as shareholder proposals, encouraged its
clients to vote in favor of the proposal. 279
A CALPERS
spokesperson explained its support for the shareholder proposal by
stating: '"Withdrawing promised benefits for any employee is not
''280
only morally reprehensible, it is plain bad business.
The critical question then becomes whether the type and
scope of support received by the 2000 IBM shareholder proposal
indicates a weakness in the model of expected shareholder
behavior. The answer is that the IBM situation highlights the
complexity in the theoretical model, but, at the end of the day, it
supports the theoretical analysis. CALPERS' position signaled its
274. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (discussing numbers of CB
conversions in recent years).
275. 2000 IBM PROXY STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 22. See I.B.M. Holders
Reject Pension-Option Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2000, at C12 (noting that
about 300 million shareholders voted in favor of the proposal while about 765
million rejected it).
276. I.B.M. Holders Reject Pension-OptionPlan,supra note 275, at C12.
277. Cynthia J. Campbell et al., Current Perspectives on Shareholder
Proposals: Lessons from the 1997 Proxy Season, 28 FIN. MGMT. 89, 92 T.2
(1999) (indicating that in 1997, ninety social policy proposals received a mean
of only 6.6% of all votes cast).
278. Duncan Hughes, IBM Taken to Task on Pensions, SUNDAY BUSINESS,
Apr.
23,
2000;
Cash
Balance
Pension
Plans,
at
http://bernie.house.gov/ibm/stockholder.asp(last visited Mar. 1, 2004).
279. Hughes, supra note 278; Cash Balance Pension Plans,supra note 278.
280. Hughes, supra note 278.
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agreement with the ethical arguments against CB plans discussed
above. 28'
CALPERS also appeared to be concerned with the
reputation effect of IBM's actions. 28 2 In any given firm, some
shareholders may agree with the ethical arguments and vote their
conscience. Most others probably will not. Shareholders that
differ from CALPERS in their view of CB plan conversions may do
so not because they find them morally reprehensible, but because
they may be driven by fiduciary obligations to constituencies.
Alternatively, they may believe that CB conversions are not bad
business. Instead, they may take the position, in accordance with
the theoretical model, that CB conversions are in the best financial
interest of the company. Perhaps most compelling, a shareholder
proposal objecting to the cash balance plan was also included on
the 2001, 2002, and 2003 IBM proxy statements. 28 3 Each year the
shareholder support for the proposal has dropped with the specific
supporting percentages being 27% in 2001; 19% in 2002; and 14%

in 2003.284
In the end, the outcomes do support the analysis of the voting
model. Even at IBM, which arguably was the highest profile, most
publicized, most heavily fought battle that we have seen so far
against implementation of a CB plan, the shareholder resolution
lost by an overwhelming majority. Thus, given a choice between
continuing a TDB plan and conversion to a DC plan of equivalent
costs, the model predicts that shareholders would vote in favor of
the CB plan conversion.
4.

Suppliers

The interests of suppliers appear to align with the interest of
shareholders and reflect some of the same complexities. As with
shareholders, some suppliers who believe that a CB plan
conversion is an unethical act may follow their conscience and
oppose the conversion.
Others may believe, for ethical or
reputation reasons, that conversions are bad business. Again,
such suppliers may vote against a conversion.
However, just as the majority of shareholders are expected to
support the CB conversions, suppliers are also likely to support
them. The financial interests of suppliers are tied to the financial
position of the company in a way similar to the ties between
shareholders and a corporation. At a minimum, suppliers would
benefit from a financially secure company that could maintain
stable supplier relationships.
281. See supra Part II.B (examining the ethical arguments opposing
conversions).
282. Hughes, supra note 278.
283. Anne Krishnan, IBM Shareholders Reject Pension Choice Proposal for
Third Time, THE HERALD-SUN, Apr. 30, 2003, at B1.
284. Id.
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If anything, the relationship between supplier and company
may be tighter because it may be more one-dimensional. In many
companies, the older employee cohort may hold some number of
company equity shares. In such an instance of overlap between
the older employee cohort and the shareholders, the potential loss
of an individual benefit under the TDB plan may outweigh the
financial gain to be realized on the shareholding through the effect
of the plan conversion. Such an individual would be expected to
oppose the CB plan conversion. One would not, however, expect
any significant overlap between the supplier population and the
older employee cohort.
5. Management
Predicting the voting pattern of management is particularly
difficult because management's interests may align with the
interests of some of the stakeholders discussed above.
The
different groups of stakeholders will tug on management in
varying ways. Under traditional views of corporate governance,
management's primary agency obligations were governed by
contractarian principles. 28 5 While complex in theory, the result
was fairly simply-management's decision-making was aligned
with the interests of equity shareholders. 2 6 As discussed above,
non-employee shareholders may take different views of a CB
conversion, but the model predicts that the majority of those
shareholders would typically support the conversion. To the
extent management acts in accordance with its obligations under
the contractarian theory of corporate governance, management
would be expected to vote in favor of the conversion of a TDB plan
to a CB plan.
It is appropriate to consider whether the expectations under
the traditional contractarian theory continue to hold true, and,
even if they do, whether practical considerations might affect the
voting patterns of management. First, the widespread adoption of
corporate constituency statutes has broadened the types of
interests that managers may consider when confronted with
complex issues inherent in CB plan conversions. 2s 7
The
constituency statutes acknowledge that the interests of employees
285. Michael Bradley et al., Challenges to Corporate Governance: The
Purposes and Accountability of the Corporation in Contemporary Society:
Corporate Governance at a Crossroads,62 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9, 33-41
(1999).
286. Id. at 37.
287. Id. at 28. See Timothy L. Fort, Religion in the Workplace: Mediating
Religion's Good, Bad and Ugly Naturally, 12 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POLY 121, 146 (1998) (stating that the "[s]takeholder theory has legal
manifestations in the form of corporate constituency statutes in which over
half the states generally allow, but do not require managers to take into
account nonshareholder constituents when making managerial decisions").
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are among the legitimate factors that may deserve consideration
by management. 288 Recognizing that management may weigh the
interests of employees brings forward a new complexity. As
discussed above, the younger employee cohort will likely vote in
favor of plan conversion whereas the older employee cohort will
likely vote against conversion. Thus, permitting management to
consider employee interests does not resolve the question of how
management would vote.
From a practical standpoint, it is useful to recognize that
management is, of course, comprised of employees. Members of
management too would be participants in the TDB plan and may
experience effects of a plan conversion. To the extent that
members of management are more likely members of the older
employee cohort rather than the younger employee cohort, their
personal interests may align with the older cohort. If they
approach the conversion decision from a position of self-interest,
management could follow the same voting pattern as the older
employee cohort. In such a case, management would vote against
plan conversion.
The complexities embedded in management's theoretical
obligations and the implications of potential self-interested
concerns in predicting
behavior raise some significant
management's voting behavior. The basic concepts observed for
other constituencies do permit some insights. The interests of
shareholders, suppliers, and the younger employee cohort militate
The
in favor of management support for plan conversions.
interests of the older employee cohort would likely align with the
self-interest of management against the conversion of plans. Yet,
as noted above, the changing demographics of the workplace
diminish the influence of the older employee cohort. In many
companies, separate benefit plans for top management provide
higher levels of pension benefits than could be provided under
either a TDB or a CB plan so, in truth, management probably
would lose little through the CB plan conversion. 28 9 Shareholder
monitoring should decrease the likelihood that management would
act in its own self-interest. 290 Thus, significant factors limit the
288. Bradley, supra note 285, at 28.
289. Plans that provide pension benefits in excess of what the IRS permits
qualified pension plans to provide are known as excess benefit plans. For
more information on those and other plans for top management employees, see
Ridgeley A. Scott, Rabbis and Other Top Hats: The Great Escape, 43 CATH. U.
L. REV. 1 (1993). According to IBM's 2000 Proxy Statement, "Retirement
benefits are provided to the executive officers of the Company... under an
unfunded, non-qualified defined benefit pension plan known as the
2000 IBM PROXY
Supplemental Executive Retention Plan (SERP)."
STATEMENT, supra note 5, at 16.
290. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Symposium: Corporate Law and Social Norms, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 1253, 1282-87 (1999).
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likelihood management would vote against plan conversions. At
the same time, other powerful forces should operate to encourage
management to support conversions.
The model, therefore,
predicts that management will vote in favor of CB plan
conversions. Practically speaking, anecdotal evidence supports the
theory. Twenty percent of the country's Fortune 1000 companies
would not have converted their pension plans from TDB plans to
CB plans without the support of management.
6. Community
The voting patterns of the community stakeholders may be
the least predictable of all. Community members might align with
any of the stakeholder groups already discussed.
Those
alignments are unpredictable because they might depend upon
social affiliations, economic relationships, ethical beliefs, future
business plans, and so forth. For example, affinity groups of the
older employee cohort might be concerned for their peers and
fearful that their employer might make similar changes.
Businesses that provide services to a customer base comprised
primarily of members of the older employee cohort and their peers
might join the opposition to plan conversion. Regardless of their
affiliations, community members who are persuaded by the ethical
arguments against conversions would be expected to vote against
the conversions. These examples only begin to scratch the surface
of the types of community members who might take an interest in
plan conversions. That means, of course, that the analysis is
equally nuanced regarding community members who would be
expected to support plan conversions.
However, as with the analysis used for management, the
predictions of the voting model for other stakeholder groups
provide some insight for the expected community reaction. So far,
the model predicts that the younger employee cohort, suppliers
and shareholders will be the most influential voters. The majority
are expected to vote in favor of plan conversions and to cause the
majority of management to vote in favor as well. The opponents
are the older employee cohort and, perhaps, limited numbers of
shareholders and a few members of management.
The most significant question, then, becomes whether the
conversion opponents could persuade enough community members
to oppose CB plan conversions that together they could offset the
stakeholders that support the conversions. Significant road blocks
impede opponents from achieving such an outcome. The effect of
the conversion of a TDB plan to a CB plan on the community will
be limited. As a result, it is unclear the extent to which the
community would be willing to become substantially involved.
Most generally, employer-sponsored pension plan issues do not
tend to generate the same level of community interest as do many
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other employment-related issues, such as racial discrimination,
sexual harassment, and affirmative action. •
In addition, the members of the shareholder group that
oppose the CB conversion may be too diverse for that group to
effectively influence the community.
To the extent that
shareholders have an actual vote on a CB plan, as they did in the
IBM situation, some of them may wield the vote against
conversion. However, it is unclear whether they will actively and
vocally oppose the plan conversion in ways that would motivate
large numbers of community members to aggressively join the
dissent.
That leaves the older employee cohort as the group that
would carry the burden in exhorting community action.
Historically, older segments of society have been successful in
organizing interest groups to represent their social and economic
interests. For example, they have long made retrenchment on
social security programs politically unacceptable. 291 As repeatedly
observed above, in the context of employment situations, workforce
factors may limit the influence of the older employee cohort.
Those factors, however, may not diminish the public voice of the
older employee cohort. Thus, that group may be the most effective
in seeking the attention and support of community members. Still
it seems likely that in most situations, the older employee cohort
will not be able to mobilize sufficient community aid to overcome
the support of the younger employee cohort, shareholders,
suppliers, and management.
B. Expected Results of the Voting Model
Overall, the voting model predicts that stakeholders will
support conversion of a TDB plan to a CB plan. The only
constituent group that clearly would oppose the conversion is the
older employee cohort. Currently, though, the position of that
group vis-a-vis other employees and shareholders is not likely
strong enough to affect the outcome of a conversion decision in the
majority of cases. Additionally, while management's interests as
senior employees might tempt them to align with the older
employee cohort, significant constraints exist to minimize the
likelihood of such an alignment. The interests of the community
are the most difficult to predict, but it seems unlikely that the
older employee cohort would mobilize sufficient support from the
community to overwhelm the voting patterns of plan conversion
proponents.

291. Stewart E. Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the
Contracts Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 720-22 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein,
Congress, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit State, 48 STAN. L.
REV. 247, 291 (1996).
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The voting model predicts that younger
workers,
shareholders, and suppliers all will favor conversion of a TDB plan
to a CB plan. In addition, the model predicts that management
will act in accordance with its agency obligations to shareholders
and vote in favor of conversion. It is likely that those groups
would also be successful in attracting some significant level of
community support.
One of the assumptions underlying the voting model was that
all stakeholders had full access to accurate information about the
adoption of the CB plan, including its effect on the benefits of
participants in the former TDB plan. Even with such information,
the voting model predicts that companies would find adequate
support for plan conversion. According to the model, even if the
disclosure requirements associated with a plan conversion are
increased, that increase would not slow the pace of CB plan
conversion decisions. Nor would more information be expected to
affect the terms of CB conversions.
If anything, enhanced
disclosure would ensure that each stakeholder group fully
understands the effect of the conversion on the group. An increase
in accurate information then would enable each group to more
accurately determine the effect of the conversion on that group,
and, thus, reinforce the predictions of the voting model.
V.

COST BURDENS OF SUBSTANTIVE REGULATION

The primary insight of the voting model is that if the intent of
regulators is to slow the pace of conversions or to affect their terms
in order to decrease the harsh impact of conversions on the older
employee cohort, then increasing the disclosure requirements is
unlikely to be effective in achieving that goal. Instead, regulators
would need to adopt substantive regulation to address those
concerns directly. An analysis of the possible approaches to
substantive regulation is beyond the scope of this article. The
voting model does provide some insights, though, on the allocation
of the cost burdens that would result from substantive regulation,
and this section briefly outlines those insights.
Substantial evidence supports the common-sense notion that
CB plans are viewed by employers as being more economically
efficient than the TDB plans they replace. To review briefly, some
employees may place a premium on CB plan benefits because they
are easy to value, accrue more evenly over a career, and are more
portable. 292 Converting to a CB plan also may financially benefit
employers who otherwise would see significant increases in their
funding obligations under a TDB plan, or a decrease in income
attributable to the excess assets held by a TDB plan. 293
292. See supra Part I.B. 1 (discussing motivations for plan conversions).
293. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text (commenting on the
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The economic effect, then, of conversion of a TDB plan to a CB
plan is to increase the competitiveness of the firm. If regulation
prohibits conversions, or causes them to occur with less efficient
terms, the effect is to cause the firm to be less competitive than it
otherwise would be.
The standard objection to regulatory
interference with plan terms is the long-term implications for the
DB plan system. By decreasing an employer's options once it has
voluntarily decided to sponsor a TDB plan, the regulation
29
discourages other employers from adopting DB plans. 4
A short-term effect would incide primarily at the firm level.
Precluding conversions or increasing their costs would cause the
larger older U.S. firms that tend to adopt TDB plans to become
less competitive than their newly established or foreign
competitors who do not provide TDB plan benefits. Given the
international boundaries and fierce competitiveness of the current
economy, the TDB plan sponsor will not be able to pass the excess
costs associated with plan sponsorship along to its customers or its
suppliers. Perhaps the plan sponsor will be able to pass the costs
along to the younger employee cohort in the form of lower than
market wages or non-pension benefits but this will be difficult
during periods of strong labor markets.
That leaves the plan sponsor two possibilities. First, it may
be able to shift the excess TDB plan costs to the older employee
cohort in the form of lower wages or non-DB plan benefits. The
plan sponsor=s ability to transfer the costs to the older employee
cohort will depend on the labor market strength of that cohort. As
discussed above, there is some evidence that the labor market
leverage of that group may be weaker than the leverage of the
295
younger employee cohort.
If the plan sponsor cannot pass the excess TDB plan costs
through to the older employee group, then the firm will be forced
to absorb the costs. That, in turn, will mean that the firm will
provide a lower rate of return to its shareholders. The equity
value of the firm will decline, causing the shareholders to
experience a decrease in their wealth.
The irony for regulation of CB conversions is that, regardless
of whether the excess costs of the TDB plan are shifted directly to
the older employee cohort or to shareholders, it is almost certain
that the older employee cohort will bear a portion of the costs of
the regulation. If the plan sponsor transfers the costs directly to
the older employee cohort, the effect is clear. The effect is more
increased costs associated eith maintaining TDB plans).
294. Dana M. Muir, Contemporary Social Policy Analysis and Employee
Benefit Programs:Boomers, Benefits, and Bargains, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1351, 1414-17 (1997).
295. See supra Part IV.A (discussing the older and younger employee

cohort).
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indirect if the plan sponsor passes the costs to shareholders. In
the large, well-established companies that tend to sponsor TDB
plans, the older employee cohort is likely to invest in employer
securities. Thus, if costs are passed to shareholders, the older
employee cohort will be affected in their role as shareholders.
with the following
This analysis leaves regulators
alternatives. First the status quo could be maintained. While
questions remain about the legality of conversions, 296 they
continue to occur unabated and relatively few regulatory
constraints are imposed upon the terms of the conversions. The
older employee cohort bears the costs of conversion at least in the
absence of any voluntary mitigating measures adopted by the plan
sponsor during the conversion. Second, substantive regulation
might be imposed to decrease the number of conversions or create
more favorable terms for the older employee cohort. As just
explained, the cost of that regulation would incide on the older
employee cohort, either alone or together with other shareholders.
Third, additional disclosure could be required. The voting model
predicts that more information will not affect the rate or the terms
of CB plan conversions. Again, in accordance with the model
developed for substantive plan regulation, older employees alone,
or in conjunction with shareholders would bear the costs of the
increased disclosure.
Obviously, the analysis does not bode well for the older
employee cohort. It does, though, highlight the economic and
demographic changes that underlie the debate over CB plan
conversions. The older employee cohort entered the workforce at a
time when large, well-established employers valued long-term
employee commitment and chose to offer TDB plans, at least in
part, to reinforce that commitment. The older employee cohort
and the employers both understood that the implicit terms of TDB
plans traded the long-term work commitment for the promise of
rapidly accelerating benefit accruals late in a long-term
employee=s career. When the economics of the situation change,
the terms of the plans and the law permit employers to amend or
terminate the plans in order to defeat that implicit bargain.
The unilateral imposition by the employer of a change in the
terms of that bargain feels unfair to many observers of CB plan
conversions. To put it in human terms recall some of the specific
examples cited by employees who have been affected by plan
conversions of TDBs. There was the twenty-eight year employee
who testified that he lost "approximately 30% of the value of my
pension, which translates into a lump-sum dollar loss well in

296. See supra Part
conversions).

II.A

(examining the legal challenges

to plan
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excess of $400,000"297 in a plan conversion. Other workers have
explained the effects as follows: "I am a 25 year Bell Atlantic
employee who has had his pension cut about 30%,"298 "[m]y best
estimate is that the change will cost me about $7500/year when I
retire,"299 and "[tlhe end result is that I have lost 41-42% of my
300
age--65 annual pension benefit."
VI. CONCLUSION

The questions left are: (1) who will bear the costs of plan
promises that were made when workplace economics were very
different than they are today, and (2) how directly is our system
willing to acknowledge those costs? The response to the first
question is that, in the environment of CB plan conversions, the
burden will fall on the older employee cohort either alone or on a
shared basis with those who hold the firm's stock at the time the
costs become evident. From a policy perspective, is it appropriate
to pass some of the burden to those shareholders? Is that part of
the risk they assumed when investing in the stock? If so, then
substantive regulation is necessary in order to ensure they bear a
portion of the burden. If not, then the least cost option for the
older employee cohort is to maintain the status quo.
Direct acknowledgement of the costs associated with
maintaining or converting TDB plans brings to the forefront policy
concerns about the voluntary system of employer-sponsored
retirement plans. If the terms of employment in U.S. workplaces
are, in fact, being restructured due to changing economic and
demographic factors, to what extent should the burden of
restructuring fall on the older employee cohort?
The U.S. pension system has now been through two periods
since ERISA's enactment in 1974 when significant numbers of
plans made changes that have allegedly defeated the implicit
contract between employers and employees.
The first period
occurred during the terminations and reversions of the early- and
mid-1980s. The second period is the current trend to CB plan
conversions.
During each period, affected older employees
complained vociferously about the unfairness of the apparently
legal plan changes, and gained some level of public support for
their position. Is the implication that ERISA should not permit
plan amendments that defeat long-term benefit expectations? If
ERISA should be amended, how could it possibly define the
difference between legitimate long-term expectations and
297. The Cash Balance Conundrum, supra note 9, at 3 (statement of James
A. Bruggeman, Employee of Central and South West Corporation).
298. Archived Guestbook, supra note 222 (Comment of Gregg Heinold on Oct.
15, 1999).
299. Id. (Comment of Larry Franks on Oct. 8, 1999).
300. Id. (Comment of John Staudt on Sept. 28, 1999).
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employee misconceptions about the scope of an employer's right to
amend its plan? More importantly, what effect would such a
limitation have on the already beleaguered TDB system?
The answers, if they exist, are beyond the scope of this article.
However, it is critical that policy makers recognize the
implications of the various legislative actions that might be taken
in response to the CB conversion controversy.
The recent
regulatory trend is to look to disclosure to address perceived
problems in the benefits system. 301 In some instances that may, in
fact, be a successful approach to accomplish its goal. Given the
economic and demographic pressures that underlie the conversion
of TDB to CB plans, the voting model that developed in this Article
predicts that enhanced disclosure does not and would not
substantially affect either the pace or the terms of plan
conversions.

301. See, e.g., Amendments to Summary Plan Description Regulations, 29
C.F.R. § 2520, 65 Fed. Reg. 70,226 (2000) (expanding disclosure requirements
for health care plans); Dana M. Muir, The Dichotomy Between Investment
Advice and Investment Education: Is No Advice Really the Best Advice?, 23
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 46-48 (2002).

